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AMERICAN NATURES: THE SHAPE OF CONFLICT IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Jedediah Purdy*
There is a firestorm of political and cultural conflict around environmental issues, including, but running well beyond, climate change. Legal scholarship is in a
bad position to make sense of this conflict because the field has concentrated on
making sound policy recommendations to an idealized lawmaker, neglecting the
deeply held and sharply clashing values that drive, or block, environmental lawmaking. This Article sets out a framework for understanding and engaging the clash of
values in environmental law and, by extension, approaching the field more generally. Americans have held, and legislated based upon, four distinct ideas about why
the natural world matters and how we should govern it. Each of these conceptions
persists in a body of environmental law, a network of interest and advocacy groups,
the attitudes and even identities of ordinary citizens, and even the American landscape. The first, providential republicanism, treats nature as intended for productive human use and gives high status to its users: this idea justified the European
claim to North America, defined public debates about nature in the early republic,
and persists in important aspects of private and public land-use law. The second
conception, progressive management, arose in the later nineteenth century as part of
a broader legal reform movement and gave its shape to much of federal lands policy,
notably creation of the national forests and national parks. In this idea, nature’s
productive use requires extensive management by public-spirited experts, whom reformers imagined as steering the environmental policy of the administrative state.
The third conception, romantic epiphany, concentrates on the aesthetic and spiritual
value of nature and has defined national parks policy, spurred creation of the national wilderness system, and lent essential support to the Endangered Species Act.
This idea entered environmental politics at the turn of the last century, with the
efforts of the Sierra Club and other innovators. The most recent conception of nature, ecological interdependence, arose in the middle of the twentieth century and
shaped much of the environmental law of the 1970s and thereafter. This conception
treats nature as an intensely inter-permeable web, of which humans are unavoidably
a part, to our benefit and hazard. All of these ideas persist in today’s environmental
law and politics and provide a map of our existing statutes and doctrines, the conflicts around those laws, and emerging issues such as climate change.
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INTRODUCTION
Environmental law is now part of the cultural conflict that shapes, or
deforms, American public life. In partisan politics, beliefs about climate
change are less empirical judgments than badges of cultural identity, signs of
who is with you and who is against you.1 In movement organizing and electioneering, the Endangered Species Act and the Environmental Protection
Agency are targets in the Tea Party’s political shooting range.2 Nor are these
1
See Dan M. Kahan et al., Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making Sense of —
and Progress in — the American Culture War of Fact, 1–2 (Yale Law Sch. Publ. Law Working
Paper No. 154, 2007), available at http://www.culturalcognition.net/projects/second-nationalrisk-culture-study.html; see also EDWARD MAIBACH ET AL., YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE
CHANGE & GEORGE MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, GLOBAL WARMING’S
SIX AMERICAS 2009: AN AUDIENCE SEGMENTATION ANALYSIS (2009), available at http://envi
ronment.yale.edu/climate/files/climatechange-6americas; Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman,
Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2006) (setting out theory
of “cultural cognition” of policy-relevant facts).
2
See Montana House Votes to Nullify Endangered Species Act, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON.,
Feb. 19, 2011, available at http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/article_85f9f7423c64-11e0-a5ec-001cc4c002e0.html (reporting that Tea Party legislators regard the Endangered Species Act as invalid); Ben McGrath, The Movement: The Rise of Tea Party Activism,
THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 1, 2010 at 40; Diane Roberts, The EPA: the Tea Party’s next target,
THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 3, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifameri
ca/2011/aug/03/epa-republicans-tea-party.
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attitudes restricted to the grassroots and hinterlands: Utah’s new Senator asserts state sovereignty over federal public lands within Utah’s borders, which
would upend the country’s land-management policy.3 Taking another step
away from empirical verification, Tea Party activists explain that they oppose environmental regulation on biblical authority.4
It is tempting to see this thorny bouquet of climate-change skepticism,
cultural politics, hostility to national government, and mixing of religion
with regulation as adding up to a revolt against reason.5 This is particularly
poignant because, for decades, much environmental law scholarship has
been implicitly addressed to an elusive and consummately rational figure we
might think of as the Enlightened Policymaker. This welfare-maximizing
lawmaker patiently awaits the delivery of a better mousetrap. Law professors have delivered, producing boatloads of work on improved design for
air-pollution law, international climate regimes, ecosystem service preservation, and so forth.6 If implemented, many of these reforms would, as promised, improve national and global welfare, overcome collective-action
problems, internalize externalities, and eliminate deadweight loss. Now, in a
perfect political, cultural, and religious storm, the boatloads of better ideas
are sinking unread. The most ironic victim is the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (“IPCC”), whose conveners have patiently assembled a
minimal scientific consensus on global warming and set out a range of cautious forecasts and stylized policy alternatives. This massive tribute to objectivity has become the target of suspicion and denunciation, including
politically motivated investigations into climate researchers’ methods, even
as popular beliefs about climate change fissure.7 Scientific consensus, meet
political cacophony. Reason, meet unreason.
3
See Phil Taylor, U.S. Not ‘Sovereign’ Over Federal Lands, Utah GOP Senate Candidate
Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2010 (describing constitutional views of now-Senator Mike Lee).
4
See John M. Broder, Climate Change Doubt Is Tea Party Article of Faith, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 2010, at A1.
5
See generally AL GORE, THE ASSAULT ON REASON (2007); CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE (2005).
6
See, e.g., RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE
POLICY: BEYOND KYOTO (2003) (sketching an interest-mediating structure for future global
climate-change policy architecture). Examples are almost quite literally innumerable and impossible to avoid in any glance at the environmental law and policy literature. The most important sub-genre is the interest-based account of collective-action failure that seeks to give a
rational-actor explanation of the failure of enlightened policy-makers to emerge or to regulate
in an enlightened way. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two
Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007) (analyzing the failure of the Kyoto Protocol as a
matter of national-interest calculations).
7
See, e.g., John M. Broder, Researcher on Climate Is Cleared in Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 2010, at A10 (noting climate change skepticism and political denunciation in background of inquiry into IPCC climate-change researchers’ methods); Editorial, Harassing Climate-Change Researchers, WASH. POST, May 29, 2011 (detailing suits and investigations by
private organizations and Virginia Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli seeking records of climate
researchers); Press Release, Sen. James Inhofe, Climate Change Update (Jan. 4, 2005), available at http://inhofe.senate.gov/pressreleases/climateupdate.htm (calling into question IPCC
methodology and linking Kyoto Protocol to French government’s ambition to “global
governance”).
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This way of seeing the matter has merit and force, to be sure. Willful
refusal to confront scientific consensus and rational argument is courting
global climate disaster. But doubling down on rationality may not be
enough, either to understand environmental challenges or to solve them. At
the most basic level, this is because scientific knowledge and rational policy
design do not tell us what to value: they give us information about cause and
effect, about what event Y is likely to follow from action X, but they do not
tell us what we should try to achieve.
The perfectly standard point that neither science nor rational design
help in making value judgments would not count for much if there were
widespread agreement about the values at stake in how we govern our use of
the natural world. The trouble is that the deep political and cultural structure
of American environmental law is one of conflict. Americans disagree, and
have long disagreed, about how to use and value the natural world. This
disagreement is electoral and policy-oriented, of course, but it also goes to
the level of personal and political identity: different conceptions of nature
have been tied up with, and often are essential to, sources of dignity and
meaning in both private and civic life. Therefore, debates about how to use
and value the natural world get persistently entangled with questions of
honor or status — questions about whose way of life is best.
These conflicts are not just cultural froth. They structure much of existing environmental and natural-resource law. Understanding them provides the key to a map of our statutory framework, an interpretive approach
to certain doctrinal disputes, and a picture of the larger cultural frame of
today’s lawmaking.
Because environmental law is structured by conflict, scholars need a
way to grasp and discuss that conflict, rather than ignore it until it blindsides
us and makes our policy-engineering proposals irrelevant. We come somewhat late to this game: in areas of public law where scholars have long
recognized the legal relevance of deep and persistent conflict, notably constitutional rights, invaluable work has traced the ways that doctrine arises
from competing visions of social life, sources of individual dignity, and the
innovations of social movements.8 This Article brings that set of concerns
fully into the study of environmental law.
The heart of the argument is this: over more than two centuries Americans have created and acted on four distinct understandings of their place in
the natural world. Each of the four involves both factual beliefs about how
nature works and closely entwined normative ideas: what is valuable in nature and, accordingly, how we should manage and use it. Each understanding of nature contributed to a major episode of lawmaking, so that all four
are now embodied in our historically layered environmental and natural-resource laws. Each one also persists in ideological and interest-based constit8
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006) (setting out an account of the role of social movements
in contesting and contributing to the meaning of basic but underspecified public values).
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uencies, and in the ideas that individual Americans carry about their place in
the larger natural world.
The oldest of these understandings, the touchstone of the early republic,
is providential republicanism. In this view, the natural world is made for
productive use: nature has a telos, to be fruitful and support human life, and
this purpose is realized only through human labor. Moreover, small-scale
private ownership of land, the sort associated with the republican thought of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, uniquely produces fruitful use, so
that political freedom and economic productivity go hand-in-hand. The dignity of the smallholder or pioneer and the progress of a continental “empire
of liberty” go hand-in-hand.9 Much of the continent’s private property in
land was created under the banner of providential republicanism, and its
tropes persist in property-rights movements, calls for local land-use sovereignty, and resistance to regulation as a centralizing, tyrannical, and possibly
European scheme against liberty.
The second understanding, which arose in the later decades of the nineteenth century, is progressive management. Its crafters and champions included President Theodore Roosevelt, who did much to establish twentiethcentury conservation policy, and Gifford Pinchot, architect of the national
forest system.10 In this view, natural systems will reliably serve human ends
only with expert governance at the system level: irrigation networks, silviculture, game preserves, and parks administration were early paradigms of
this understanding. Progressive management carries its own idea of political
community: a form of broadly utilitarian solidarity, in which government has
the duty to promote the aggregate interest of Americans across generations.
It also introduces a paradigmatic human user of nature: not the individual
owner, but the scientifically trained and public-spirited manager. Progressive management is written into the country’s public land laws, including the
national forests, national parks, and grazing lands. In sum, these principles
govern well over a quarter of the acreage of the United States. On a more
parochial note, the law professors who write for an Enlightened Policymaker
are carrying on the work of progressive management, though they are not
always aware that their project is just one of four American attitudes to
nature.
The third attitude is romantic epiphany. In this view, certain places or
qualities in the natural world elicit essential human experiences. Alone in
the wilderness, or facing the dramatic vistas that Romantic aesthetics
deemed sublime, people could shake off habit and custom, discover their
authentic wishes and convictions, and become, in that respect, more free.
Romantic epiphany has seemed a way to salvage individuality and meaning
from a disenchanted and pervasively managed world. The more than 100
9
GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1789–1815, 357 (2009).
10
See DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS WARRIOR: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE
CRUSADE FOR AMERICA 396–430 (2009) (discussing the development of Roosevelt’s conservation policy and his relationship with Pinchot).
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million acres of federal land reserved as statutory wilderness form the largest
legacy of romantic epiphany in the law.11 The leading way of talking about
the value of national parks, as a kind of secular cathedral, is also a direct
legacy of romantic epiphany. So are important advocacy organizations such
as the Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club.
The fourth American understanding of nature, ecological interdependence, developed within the last half-century and remains the most openended in its meaning. The central idea here is that the world is a system of
deeply permeable systems, in which environmental effects move through
complex, remote, and often invisible pathways — relations that Aldo Leopold popularized as a kind of scientific pastoral, and Rachel Carson as an
apocalyptic account of undetectable yet deadly threat.12 Ecological interdependence has been associated with a blended aesthetic and ethical attitude:
the perception that human life is intertwined with a vast web of natural phenomena in which some observers discover inspiration, wonder, or humility.
The regulatory statutes that were passed beginning in 1969 and continuing
through the 1970s are deeply inflected by the concern with interdependent
systems that defines ecological interdependence. The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the
Endangered Species Act are the most prominent examples of statutes from
this era, which produced much of modern environmental law.13
This Article describes the rise and interaction of these four views of the
natural world. The story is cumulative: earlier views persist as new ones
arise, both through their legislative offspring and as organizing ideas for
competing groups. It is thus a story about how political ideas contribute to
legal change, and also about how ideas, once established in identities and
institutions, can reinforce legal entrenchment and constrain ongoing political
debates.
This history makes special use of two concepts: environmental public
language14 and the environmental imagination.15 Public language is a pol11
See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW
24 (6th ed. 2007).
12
See M. Jimmie Killingsworth & Jacqueline S. Palmer, Millennial Ecology: The Apocalyptic Narrative from Silent Spring to Global Warming, in GREEN CULTURE: ENVIRONMENTAL
RHETORIC IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 21, 27–32 (Carl G. Herndl & Stuart C. Brown eds.,
1996) (discussing Carson’s rhetorical style and origins); DONALD WORSTER, NATURE’S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS 284–90 (1994) (describing Leopold’s development of
his mature view on the human relationship to nature and characterizing that view).
13
See generally National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat.
852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006)); Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-64, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(2006)); Federal Water Pollution and Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. (2006)); Endangered
Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531–1544 (2006)).
14
This not-very-elegant term is my own, as far as I know, but it has origins in two other
major approaches to the study of political language. The first is the serious study of political
rhetoric as an aspect of a normative public culture. See JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL
PRESIDENCY 14 (1987) (“Political rhetoric is, simultaneously, a practical result of basic doc-
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ity’s lexicon of political and legal persuasion, the repertoire of its ongoing
arguments. Public language encompasses recognized terms of condemnation and exhortation, and the principles, purposes, and dangers that one can
credibly invoke in such settings as legislative debate, regulation, or adjudication.16 Imagination refers to what public language typically presupposes, a
shared image of the world and our situation in it, a blend of fact and value
that includes ideas about both how things work and how they matter. The
environmental imagination helps to make ways of valuing and using the natural world self-evident, intelligible, or bizarre categories whose content has
changed greatly over two-plus centuries.
The value of attending to environmental language and imagination is
not only descriptive and diagnostic, though it most certainly is that. Simply
taking the existing contours of environmental law and politics as given and
showing their sources in cultural and political conflict can give the impression of merely narrating how environmental law came to seem besieged by
unmeritorious passions. Ultimately, the aim of this cultural history is more
and different. By showing that today’s environmental ideas are the products
of the human power to reinterpret our relation to the natural world and create, or discern, new reasons to act in new ways, this history gives a reminder
that our future environmental law and politics might look as different from
the present as the present does from the past. This will be particularly so if
social movements and political leaders formulate creative responses to
emerging challenges such as climate change. The lesson of this history,
then, is partly to illuminate the way in which we sometimes come to be
stuck, but it is also to give a reminder of the power that can set us loose to
take new directions.
As the body of this Article indicates, people adopt or create novel ideas
about nature for several kinds of reasons, which may overlap in any specific
case. First, the idea may unify a variety of phenomena or problems in a way
trines of governance, and an avenue to the meaning of alternative constitutional understandings.”). The second is the careful study of the specific uses to which general terms are put in
the context of time and place. Associated with the “Cambridge School” of intellectual historians, this approach is nicely captured in James Tully, The Pen Is a Mighty Sword: Quentin
Skinner’s Analysis of Politics, in MEANING & CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 7,
7–25 (James Tully ed., 1988).
15
Lawrence Buell has made this term central to his analysis of the American literary
canon. See LAWRENCE BUELL, THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMAGINATION: THOREAU, NATURE WRITING, AND THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 2–3, 6–8 (1995) (explaining his investigation of literature as an exercise in interpreting the human relation to the natural world). Where
Buell is interested in the view of nature expressed in literary texts, I am concerned with ways
of experiencing nature in everyday life that are presupposed by public language. In this respect, my formulation owes a lot to Charles Taylor’s discussion of “social imaginaries.” See
CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 171–76 (2007); CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL
IMAGINARIES 23–30 (2004). I use a similar idea in discussing implicit social visions in the
development of property law: JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 9–12 (2010).
16
As these examples suggest, what counts as public language varies with the context and
the problem at hand. I use the same term to organize a companion piece that overlaps with this
Article: Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Democracy, and Environmental Law, 119 YALE L.J. 1122 (2010).
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that helps people to grasp and engage them. As Parts II and IV argue, the
concepts of conservation and the environment tied together disparate challenges, making it possible to address them under an organizing label that
motivated and shaped responses.17 Second, the idea may provide a justification for doing something a person is already motivated to do: in the simplest
rendering of this version, ideas are ideological tricks for elevating material
interests that one would hold regardless. There must be something to this
version, even if it is too simple. The story that Part I tells, providential
republicanism’s justification of the European claim to North America, is the
best candidate for this version: there is a plausible case that Europeans, technologically superior and land-hungry, would have found a way to justify (at
least to themselves) their taking the continent, no matter the conceptual tools
they had for that task. (As I shall argue shortly, however, I think this cannot
be the whole story.) Third, ideas may serve a rather different set of human
interests, those sometimes called ideal interests: interests in meaning, dignity, recognition, a sense that one’s life has value and purpose and that others
see it in that light.18 It is central to the argument here that each of the major
versions of environmental imagination has importantly served these latter
interests, elevating the status of various groups that adopted them (such as,
respectively in Parts I-IV, pioneer laborers and yeomen, experts and administrators, aesthetes and outdoor enthusiasts, and egalitarian skeptics of twentieth-century industrial versions of progress). Some innovations, most
prominently romantic epiphany, have also addressed the need for meaning
on an individual rather than a social level, assuring their converts that the
natural world, properly understood, showed that life in general, and their
lives in particular, were valuable and meaningful.19 This last example shades
over into the fourth motive that new ideas serve: they enable people to reinvent themselves, or to be converted, into new kinds of people. They help,
in other words, to address the very old question of who to be, a question
whose urgency is more widespread and acutely felt in this post-traditional
world than in most of history.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, this Article’s history suggests
that even when ideas arise to justify or facilitate the pursuit of material interests, this does not mean that ideas can be reduced to interests. This is so for

17
This approach to ideas, treating them as tools for organizing and engaging experience, is
generally called pragmatic, and is fairly well captured in RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF
PRAGMATISM 160–75 (1982) (setting out the pragmatist approach).
18
See JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
22–30 (1999) (characterizing human motives rooted in the need for moral meaning and order);
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 204–25 (1984) (characterizing the need for a coherent sense of narrative in one’s life); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF
THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 25–52 (1989) (arguing for the inescapable
relevance of meaning and moral considerations to humans’ capacity to make sense of their
lives and act and choose as agents); H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, Introduction to FROM MAX
WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 3, 61–65 (1948) (setting out the interplay of ideas and interests
in the thought of pioneering sociologist Max Weber).
19
See GLOVER, supra note 18, at 26–30; MACINTYRE, supra note 18, at 204–25.

R
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at least two reasons. First, some “interests” motivate actors only because
the actors have already adopted new ideas of nature’s value. An interestbased account of twentieth-century public-lands law, emphasizing the influence of groups of well-organized preservationists and their agency allies, can
work only because those groups had developed a new view of the value of
the landscapes they worked to preserve.
Public language acts as an important filter, allowing some interests to
be translated into politically and legally persuasive claims while others are
discounted or excluded from the political community. As Part I explains,
frontier settlers’ interest in access to land and other resources took special
force from the influence of providential republicanism. We see in Part II
that the introduction of romantic epiphany to public language made a value
that would once have seemed personal and effete into a canonical justification of parks and other scenic lands.
The general point, then, is that ideas matter, not only as justifications of
things people already wish to do, but as ways of choosing or discerning what
is worth doing and even what kind of life is worth living. Even ideas that
arguably begin as responses to material interests, such as providential republicanism with relation to European settlers’ wish to claim the continent,
frame the self-understanding of those who adopt the ideas and the public
language in which later arguments take place.
Two clarifying points are essential. First, none of the four understandings of nature is static or monolithic. They were produced as ways of explaining and defending actions people believed important to undertake in a
given historical moment, or of engaging keenly felt problems such as a perceived decline in civic virtue or a crisis of religious faith. They persist as
elements of environmental imagination and public language because people
continue to find occasions to use them, and, in using them, sometimes blend
and change them. This Article’s ideal-type, or stylized, account of the four
understandings unavoidably conceals complexity and variation; on the
whole, though, this is a modest price for a gain in clear and tractable descriptions of ideas that have been mainly implicit in environmental law scholarship before now. Second, the list of four understandings leaves out a good
deal, notably Native American relations to nature, the slave plantations of
the antebellum South (and the semi-free rural labor that often followed it,
such as sharecropping), and the experience of contemporary immigrant
populations, such as Southern California’s Latinos. The logic of the omissions is that this Article is not a cultural or intellectual history of ideas about
nature, but an account of language and imagination that contributed directly
to the formation of environmental law.20 The larger story must be rich and
important, but it is for a different project.
20
See, e.g., William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness, or, Getting Back to the Wrong
Nature, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE 471, 489–90 (J. Baird Callicott & Michael
P. Nelson eds., 1998) (discussing the race- and class-specific origins of environmental policy
and imagination and their exclusionary effects); Arturo Gomez-Pompa & Andrea Kaus, Taming the Wilderness Myth, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE 293, 293–309 (J. Baird
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The body of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes how providential republicanism supported a continental program of private-property
creation, which dominated United States resource law until the end of the
nineteenth century. Part II presents progressive management, explaining
how a theory of expert governance over complex systems took natural resources as its paradigm for a larger reform program. Reformers created national forests and parks as models of their touchstone values:
intergenerational responsibility, civic virtue, and the enrichment of leisure.
Part III turns to romantic epiphany and explains how the Sierra Club and its
allies turned an established literary and aesthetic theme — the illuminating
and redemptive power of natural beauty — into a form of social life and part
of public language that soon became central to environmental politics and
lawmaking. Part IV introduces ecological interdependence, which rests on
the perception that all parts of the natural world, including human beings,
are interdependent and often fragile, and thus vulnerable to environmental
crises that could affect whole systems of living things.
Part V sets out some ways that the framework developed earlier in the
Article can help to structure understanding of today’s environmental law and
politics. This Article’s typology of conflicting conceptions of nature can organize three kinds of inquiry. First, it provides a map of the various statutes
that make up this area of law, showing how each contains the premises of
one view (or more) of the natural world, and how courts mediating among
conflicting sources of law are also resolving conflicts among basic views of
nature. Second, the typology helps to sort the political attitudes that underlie
environmental lawmaking and disputes about the application and interpretation of environmental law. This Article gives the basis for a hypothesis that
the four competing views of nature may be the bases of disagreements over
more specific issues, such as whether climate change is real and humancaused. Third, the Article’s typology shows a way of mapping literal landscapes. Much of North America has been physically shaped by legal application of basic and contested premises about the value of nature and how
humans should govern it. Both federal public lands and, perhaps more surprisingly, much private land is explicitly or implicitly dedicated to one conception of nature by the operation of law.
I. THE PROVIDENTIAL REPUBLICAN LANDSCAPE
The term providential republicanism names a way of imagining North
America that infused much of nineteenth-century law and politics. The continent was empty “wilderness” or “waste,” and settling it would “reclaim”
the land from this condition.21 The emptiness had a double sense. SupportCallicott & Michael P. Nelson eds., 1998) (discussing the exclusion of rural and especially
non-white users of land from the development of wilderness concepts).
21
James Buchanan, President, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 6, 1858) (summarizing the task of territorial settlement as “generally to reclaim the wilderness”).
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ers of westward settlement imagined and portrayed the continent as thinly
populated and uncultivated. They argued that the frontier was also legally
empty because light and transient land use established, at best, weak and
uncertain property rights. Reclaiming the continent meant filling both sorts
of emptiness by pressing westward settlement and cultivation, private property, and republican government.22 In the rhetoric of the time, these touchstones of economic and political progress joined in an image of a free
American landscape, orderly and fruitful. This ideal stood in contrast to two
alternatives: unredeemed wilderness, alarming but full of promise, and an
infertile, withered landscape that was yoked rhetorically to political tyranny.
Providential republicanism thus held two tasks to be mutually supporting:
fulfilling the purpose of the natural world, which was to support human life
amply, and achieving human freedom through self-government by equal citizens. These two tasks might even be identical, if westward settlement indistinguishably advanced both.
In this respect, providential republicanism set a precedent for the development of American environmental imagination by tying a conception of
nature’s purpose to images of the ideal citizen and the national polity. Providential republicanism associated the dignity of being American with productive labor, particularly the sort that opened the frontier, and with the kind of
personal independence that westward settlement ostensibly made possible.
Accordingly, the American nation was figured as a community of independent, laboring individuals and their families, and American lawmaking, at
least notionally, should secure the conditions for such people to flourish.
This ideal was defined in part by a set of personal, political, and ecological
counterpoints: personal dependence on social or legal superiors, tyrannical
government that interfered with the activity of free individuals, and a landscape allowed to lie fallow rather than bear fruit under labor.
A. The Law and Anthropology of Continental Settlement
To appreciate the idea that the continent, although inhabited by Native
Americans, was not used in ways that could support indigenous ownership
rights, consider this argument from James Kent, New York’s chancellor, lecturer in law at Columbia, and author of the influential Commentaries on
American Law.23 Kent took up “the foundation of title to land”24 in the
United States a short time after Chief Justice Marshall had addressed the
issue in Johnson v. M’Intosh.25 Marshall, in ruling that citizens of the United
States could not acquire title by purchase from Native Americans, expressly
sidestepped issues of “abstract justice,” such as the claim that farmers en-

22

See infra Part I.A.
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES
24
Id. at 307.
25
21 U.S. 543 (1823).
23

ON

AMERICAN LAW VOL. 3 (1828).
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joyed a natural right to expropriate the lands of nomadic hunters.26 After
recounting the essentials of Marshall’s reasoning, Kent stepped squarely into
the issue that the Court had avoided, arguing that abstract justice did support
European expropriation.27 Kent first argued for the continent’s legal emptiness: “[e]rratic tribes” of “hunters” could not acquire lasting title to property, for their transient occupation gave them only “the loose and frail, if not
absurd title of wandering savages. . . .”28 Second was the emptiness of nonuse. This “immense continent” was “evidently designed by Providence to
be subdued and cultivated, and to become the residence of civilized nations.”29 Kent embraced “the true principles of natural law” expounded by
Emmerich de Vattel, who had “observed[ ] that the cultivation of the soil
was an obligation imposed by nature upon mankind . . . .”30 The continent
was devoid of its normative use, which was imparted by God and discernible
by natural reason: to be fruitful and support extensive settlement. Native
American occupation not only failed to establish property rights, but also
violated the duty to cultivate the land.
This theory had roots in the thought of Hugo Grotius and John Locke,
but Americans did not simply repeat that natural-law tradition.31 They emphasized and amplified one strand in a legal tradition that had produced robust debates about the justice of colonial expropriation. The idea that the
continent was legally empty was much less influential in England and colonial North America than in the Revolutionary period and the early United
States, when westward settlement became a national preoccupation.32 In
keeping with changing legal theory, both popular and legal materials in the
26
Id. at 572 (declining to base opinion “singly on . . . principles of abstract justice”); id.
at 588 (declining to decide on “abstract principles” whether cultivators can displace noncultivators). Marshall held that the federal government was the sole source of ownership cognizable in American courts; he reasoned from the custom of Europe’s colonial powers and the
early United States, with some emphasis on the reliance interest of Americans who had settled
the continent deep into the Midwest. Id. at 587–604.
27
KENT, supra note 23, at 312 (“If the settled doctrine on the subject of Indian rights and
titles was now open for discussion, the reasonableness of it might be strongly vindicated
. . . .”).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
See RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
58–81 (1979) (describing Grotius’s theory of the origin and character of property rights);
JAMES TULLY, AN APPROACH TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: LOCKE IN CONTEXTS 137–76 (1993)
(describing the reception and use of Locke’s natural-rights theory in relation to aboriginal land
claims); David Armitage, John Locke, Carolina, and the Two Treatises of Government, 32
POL. THEORY 602 (2004) (describing the interaction between Locke’s involvement in colonial
settlement and administration and his writing the Two Treatises).
32
See STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE
FRONTIER 10–48, 121–60 (2005) (on the early belief that Native Americans enjoyed certain
claims and the later erosion of this belief); LISA FORD, SETTLER SOVEREIGNTY: JURISDICTION
AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA, 1788–1836 13–29, 183–203 (2010)
(describing parallel growth of natural-rights claims to settlement in two settler colonies). But
see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 233–286 (1990) (arguing that the natural-rights theory had a more
continuous influence).
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early republic increasingly portrayed Native American land use as vagrant
and irregular, a departure from earlier recognition that many indigenous peoples did cultivate and permanently occupy their lands.33 It took work to recast North America as an empty land.
This view of the continent was not monolithic even in its heyday: some
colonists and citizens of the early republic defended Native American claims
to ownership (sometimes in defense of their own putative purchases from
indigenous occupants), and the federal government’s practice was to take
title to Indian land through the form of voluntary transactions, not by the
Vattelian natural-rights claim that Kent endorsed.34 The doctrine of Johnson
v. M’Intosh was a hybrid, assigning Native Americans a usufructuary right to
occupy and use their traditional lands, which fell well short of ownership.35
Nonetheless, such halfway positions were routinely hedged around with assertions that Native American land use amounted to profligate waste of a
continent.36 There was widespread and basic agreement with the thrust of
John Quincy Adams’s rhetorical question:
Shall the lordly savage . . . . forbid the wilderness to blossom like
the rose? Shall he forbid the oaks of the forest to fall before the
axe of industry, and rise again, transformed into the habitations of
ease and elegance? Shall he doom an immense region of the globe
to perpetual desolation . . . . [and] the fields and the vallies, which
a beneficent God has formed to teem with the life of innumerable
multitudes, be condemned to everlasting barrenness?37
The continent belonged to those who could make it bloom.
B. The Language of Wilderness and Waste
These ideas underlay a lexicon for the American landscape. Thus the
“wilderness” of the frontier was to be “reclaimed,” brought into the right
use.38 President John Tyler praised “our fellow-citizens who press forward
33

See BANNER, supra note 32, at 121–60.
See id. at 10–48 (describing purchase practices); TULLY, supra note 31, at 148–51
(describing colonial debates).
35
See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823).
36
See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES VOL.
1, 7 (1891) (rejecting the natural-rights theory but characterizing the European view of Native
Americans as “a savage race, sunk in the depths of ignorance and heathenism . . . [and] bound
to yield to the superior genius of Europe . . . .”); id. at 106 (“We have . . . seen that the title of
the Indians was not treated as a right of propriety and dominion . . . . As infidels, heathen, and
savages, they were not allowed to possess the prerogatives belonging to absolute, sovereign,
and independent nations. The territory over which they wandered, and which they used for
their temporary and fugitive purposes, was, in respect to Christians, deemed as if it were
inhabited only by brute animals.” (footnote omitted)).
37
John Quincy Adams, President, An Oration, Delivered at Plymouth 23–24 (Dec. 22,
1802).
38
Besides the presidential language cited in the next sentence, see infra notes 39–42, this
pairing of terms also appeared in judicial language. See Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 43 (1823)
(“Of all the attributes of sovereignty, none is more indisputable than that of its action upon its
34

R
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into the wilderness and are the pioneers in the work of its reclamation,”39
and President James Buchanan summarized the task of territorial settlement
as “generally to reclaim the wilderness . . . .”40 Wilderness was not necessarily unpopulated (it might, in particular, be full of Native Americans); rather,
what defined it was that it was uncultivated.41 Thus, for the first half of the
nineteenth century, wilderness seems to have been synonymous in public
language with waste, literally empty terrain, but also unproductive land.42
Thus, while wilderness for the earliest New England colonists had a biblical
resonance, as a horrid but significant place of sojourn and trial, it now signified land whose destiny was unfulfilled, and which awaited reclamation by
the axe and plough.43
As we shall see, later changes in the sense of these two words marked
significant shifts in the public language of nature. Waste came to have
something nearer its contemporary meaning, of land ruined by poor use.
Cast as a more general idea of incompetent use of resources, it became the
defining bête noire of progressive management.44 Wilderness took on a new,
positive sense, as the repository of Romantic virtues inhering in untamed
nature, and preserving it became a major goal of public-lands management.45
In the early nineteenth century, however, these two conjoined terms formed
a defining contrast to the settled landscape that providential republicanism
own territory. If that territory happens to be in a waste and wilderness state, it may pass laws
to reclaim it; to encourage its population; to promote cultivation; to increase production.”).
This particular pairing of terms, naturally, stands in for a larger idea, often expressed in different words. Thus, for example, the Tennessee Supreme Court opined in 1835, “[t]hat mere
wandering tribes of savages, or such as have a stated place of residence, should claim a vast
extent of forest . . . and exclude the cultivation of the earth, is unreasonable and unjust.” State
v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256, 266 (1935). The court continued, “[t]he earth was created for the
general benefit of its inhabitants . . . . In order to sustain its vast population the earth must be
cultivated; and it is manifestly unjust, that a comparatively small number of its inhabitants
should claim an exclusive right to a large portion of its surface . . . .” Id. at 340.
39
John Tyler, President, Third Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 5, 1843).
40
James Buchanan, President, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 6, 1858).
41
Thus to remove Indians from lands where they had been settled as cultivators was to
“thrust [them] into the wilderness again.” Rutherford B. Hayes, President, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1877); see also Benjamin Harrison, President, First Annual Message
to Congress (Dec. 3, 1889) (“We can no longer push the Indian back into the wilderness
. . . .”).
42
See Thomas Jefferson, President, Fifth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1805)
(stating that settled Indian tribes “find it their interest . . . to dispose of parts of their surplus
and waste lands” to white settlers); Andrew Jackson, President, Fourth Annual Message to
Congress (Dec. 4, 1832) (“[A] portion of the waste lands owned by the States should be
ceded to the United States for the purposes of general harmony and as a fund to meet the
expenses of the war.”); Martin van Buren, President, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec.
5, 1837) (stating that settlers moving westward in rapid and opportunistic fashion left “immense wastes behind them and enlarge[d] the frontier beyond the means of the Government to
afford it adequate protection . . . .”).
43
See generally PERRY MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS (1956) (discussing the
early New England sense of mission).
44
See discussion infra Part II.A.
45
See JOHN MUIR, OUR NATIONAL PARKS 1 (1901) (arguing “wildness is a necessity”); id.
at 3 (recommending we “take stock of our wildness”); id. at 22 (praising the “untrodden
wilderness”); id. at 94 (“[T]o the north and south you behold a sublime wilderness . . . .”).
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embraced, a contrast premised on the superiority of settling and using the
land: wilderness or waste land was an invitation, even a call, to
development.
C. Political Argument and the Ideal Landscape
Providential republicanism established a recurring feature of American
environmental argument: the ideal landscape, which visually exemplified the
right human relation to nature and was often contrasted to misused or disorderly landscapes. A sort of summation-by-diorama of a theory, the ideal
landscape portrayed the fruits of collaboration between human effort and
natural design. Such images served as exhortation and reassurance, by portraying nature as the unfailing helpmate of its human inhabitants, and also as
warning, by rendering vividly the bad consequences of departing from right
use of the natural world.
A fruitful landscape bespoke both freedom and prosperity. It is well
known that early Americans linked the prospects of republican freedom to
the plenitude of the frontier.46 In Eric Foner’s formulation, free land was the
condition for a nation of free men because it made possible widespread and
expanding ownership, giving everyone (in theory) the chance to become a
proprietor.47 The social ideal of small-scale ownership helped, in turn, to
establish an ideal of personal dignity, free labor, in which manual and other
productive work was revalued from a mark of low status to an egalitarian
emblem of personal worth.48 The frontier made this ideal a widely shared
prospect, and, in rhetoric and to considerable degree in fact, the propertybuilding activity of small-scale labor made the frontier.
What is easy to overlook in this familiar story is how fully its partisans
enlisted a vision of American nature in its support. A free people was also a
productive people, and nature answered their yeoman labor with fruitfulness.
Political rhetoric knitted together freedom and prosperity in an image of the
ideal American landscape — and its opposite, an infertile landscape of tyranny. James Wilson gave a model of this rhetoric in a 1788 Independence
Day address, contrasting the era of ancient Roman liberty, when “smiling
harvests bore testimony to the bountiful boons of liberty,” with the present:

46
Thomas Jefferson argued in his first inaugural address that the United States could
avoid the crowded cities and political tyranny that had shaped European history, thanks to an
open continent with enough land to hold a thousand generations of settlers. Thomas Jefferson,
President, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801).
47
ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 9–38 (1970) (describing the interlaced premises of free-labor
thought and the program of frontier settlement). See also DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE
REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 48–100, 185–208 (1980) (describing “republican” conception of proprietor-based freedom and virtue, and the role of frontier
settlement in promoting it); WOOD, supra note 9, at 357–99 (discussing the Jeffersonian program of western settlement).
48
See FONER, supra note 47, at 1–72 (discussing the dignity of labor); WOOD, supra note
9, at 347–56 (discussing the revaluation of labor).
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“Waste and barrenness appear . . . in all their hideous forms . . . . With
double tyranny the land is cursed.”49 In republican North America, free
Rome was reborn ecologically as well as politically: Wilson concluded with
an “enrapturing prospect . . . . Placid husbandry walks in front, attended by
the venerable plough. Lowing herds adorn our vallies; bleating flocks
spread over our hills; verdant meadows, enamelled pastures, yellow harvests, bending orchards, rise in rapid succession from east to west.”50
George Perkins Marsh, the pioneering naturalist whose Man and Nature laid
the groundwork for progressive management, attributed his paradigmatic
case of ecological decline, the Mediterranean, to “the brutal and exhausting
despotism [of the Roman imperium and] . . . the host of temporal and spiritual tyrannies which she left in her dying curse.”51 Natural fertility thus
went with ordered liberty, waste with unjust government, so that the land
itself expressed the character of the polity that inhabited it.
The optimistic side of this coin ran to outright ecological fantasy, most
famously in the theory that “rain follows the plow,” that is, cultivation of
arid regions would train the atmosphere to moisture, a view whose champions included prominent geologist Ferdinand Hayden and Charles Francis
Adams, editor of The Nation.52 On the strength of this idea, the 1869 Report
of the Commissioner of Agriculture reported of the Dakota Territory that
“[a]pprehensions of drought” had given way to confidence that tree planting and “extension of the area of cultivation” would bring rain to settlers.53
These forecasts encouraged rapid settlement of High Plains regions that
could not sustain farming without irrigation. Disastrous droughts later drove
settlers back across the hundredth meridian, the approximate eastern boundary of the arid West.
These theories were sometimes vague on whether republican settlement
produced ecological fertility or vice-versa, an ambiguity easy to maintain in
the conviction that the two were mutually supporting. William Gilpin, Gov49
James Wilson, Oration Delivered on the Fourth of July 1788, at the Procession Formed
at Philadelphia to Celebrate the Adoption of the Constitution of the United States (Jul. 4,
1788), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, at 288 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall
eds., 2007). Double tyranny referred to the combination of political despotism and Catholicism, a formulation that persisted in these quasi-ecological polemics well into the nineteenth
century.
50
Id. at 293.
51
GEORGE PERKINS MARSH, MAN AND NATURE 11 (David Lowenthal ed., 2003) (1864).
With American land use his main concern, Marsh argued, “[m]an cannot struggle at once
against crushing oppression and the destructive forces of inorganic nature,” and when those
burdens are joined, “the fields he has won from the primeval wood relapse into their original
state of . . . unprofitable forest growth, or fall into that of a dry and barren wilderness.” Id. at
11–12. For a brief but provocative sketch of Marsh’s New England-based politics, which made
him skeptical of rapid westward expansion and supportive of settlement and stewardship in the
East, see Steven Stoll, Farm against Forest, in AMERICAN WILDERNESS: A NEW HISTORY 55,
65–67 (Michael Lewis ed., 2007).
52
See Gary D. Libecap & Zeynep Kocabiyik Hansen, “Rain Follows the Plow” and Dryfarming Doctrine: The Climate Information Problem and Homestead Failure in the Upper
Great Plains, 1890–1925, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 86, 93–94 (2002).
53
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE 608 (1869).
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ernor of Colorado and among the most inspired rhetoricians of manifest
destiny, declared that on a uniquely fruitful continent, where every region
was suited to support human life, geographic and political forces led to the
same end:
Political societies and empires have in all ages conformed
themselves to emphatic geographical facts. This Democratic Republican empire of North America is, then, predestined to expand
and fit itself to the continent. . . .
In geography the antithesis of the old world, in society we are
and will be the reverse . . . .
Behold, then . . . the empire which industry and self-government create . . . hewed out of the wilderness — its weapons, the
axe and plow; its tactics, labor and energy; its soldiers, free and
equal citizens.54
In this passage, geography is literally destiny, carried out through the labor
of agricultural settlement and realized in a political community of equal
citizens.
Two rather opposite impulses helped to sustain the vision of a free and
dignifying life on an endlessly fruitful continent, with sometimes cruelly
paradoxical effect. One was genuine egalitarianism within the polity, radical
enough in some hands to make free labor an engine of anti-slavery.55 The
other was refusal to tolerate, and what sometimes seemed incapacity to acknowledge, outside constraints on the expansion of the community — which
would, after all, have implied limits to the logic of expanding proprietorship.
The refusal of external limits had its most vivid expression in the erasure of
Native American rights and, indeed, of many of the facts of Native American land use.
D. The Legal Program and Culture of Providential Republicanism
The providential republican program was to make the continent fruitful
by disbursing land to private owners and promoting infrastructure to translate their labors into continental commerce. This is not the place even to
summarize the legal details of these policies, which formed much of the
federal government’s domestic activity in the nineteenth century and persisted until Franklin Roosevelt withdrew the remaining federal lands from

54

WILLIAM GILPIN, MISSION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN PEOPLE, GEOGRAPHICAL, SOCIAL,
POLITICAL 69–70 (2d ed. 1874).
For an example of the mutual support of free-labor ideas and abolitionism, see generally
RICHARD HILDRETH, DESPOTISM IN AMERICA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE, RESULTS, AND
LEGAL BASIS OF THE SLAVE-HOLDING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1854). By contrast,
prominent defenders of slavery were often scornful critics of labor markets as disguised forms
of coercion. See GEORGE FITZHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL! OR SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 218–19
(C. Van. Woodward ed., 1960) (1857).
AND

55
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settlement in 1934.56 The sweep of the story is susceptible to top-down portrayals, such as Willard Hurst’s classic picture of a federal strategy of releasing human energy and initiative through the legal architecture of
settlement,57 and bottom-up accounts emphasizing the settlers’ shared conviction in their right to land and their cooperation in arrangements that
Washington often ended up having to embrace or, at least, accommodate.58
That the account runs well with either emphasis bespeaks pervasively shared
ideas. Despite disputes about internal improvements and sectional and class
conflicts over the terms of expansion, Americans from federal legislators to
frontier settlers converged on the program of continental settlement.
We get a sharp expression of the ideas behind this program where they
were mobilized in resistance to early proposals that the federal government
should retain and manage public lands. The lines of the settler imagination
were on vivid display in congressional opposition to federal management of
forests and creation of national parks. In 1878, Interior Secretary Carl
Schurz took unprecedented action against commercial cutting on public
lands, fining and seeking prosecution of those who cut public timber without
permission.59 Traditionalist senators reacted furiously, rallying around the
right of settlers to extract wealth from the public domain. They argued that
Schurz’s policy would turn pioneers in the territories into second-class citizens and establish tyranny and desolation in the West. They linked clearing
and using land with inviolable human rights, invoking the Declaration of
Independence to compare the policy-makers of Washington, D.C. to the despotic King George portrayed in that document — which had denounced the
1763 prohibition on settlement west of the Alleghenies.60 Evoking the infertile landscapes of tyranny that were conventional in this rhetoric, they called
Schurz’s prohibitions an attempt to lock each settler family into primitive
autarky,61 a “spoliation” and “robbery of the poor”62 that would drive settlers into “barbarism” and end by depopulating the Western lands.63 They
also insisted that, because timbering had been permitted for earlier waves of

56
For the best account of this history, see generally PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC
LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968).
57
WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956) (arguing that the federal design of settlement carried out a policy
of unleashing human energy and initiative).
58
See, e.g., GATES, supra note 56, at 152–63 (describing informal “claims associations”
that often succeeded in allocating frontier land); GARY LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY
RIGHTS 29–50 (1989) (providing historical and theoretical bottom-up account of Western mineral regimes employing rational-actor model).
59
See GATES, supra note 56, at 548 (describing George Perkins Marsh’s influence on
timbering enforcement).
60
7 CONG. REC. 1722 (1878) (statement of Sen. Blaine) (“I know nothing in the world to
parallel it except that great assertion in our immortal Declaration of Independence that the
King of England ‘has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers to
harass our people, and eat out their substance.’”).
61
See id. at 1861 (statement of Sen. Blaine).
62
Id. at 1865 (statement of Sen. Eustis).
63
See id. at 1867 (statements of Sen. Sargent).
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settlers in the East and Midwest, regulating Western cutting would deny the
latest pioneers equal standing in the polity.64
The same ideas figured prominently in the Senate’s discussions of Yellowstone National Park, established in 1872, and the 1864 grant of Yosemite
Valley to California “for public use, resort, and recreation.”65 The places
that those acts set aside are today’s paradigms of public-minded preservation
and, in particular, touchstones for romantic epiphany. In the original legislative debates, however, even the parks’ supporters treated them as anomalous
departures from a general practice of disbursing public land for private, economically productive use. Moreover, the aesthetic value that supporters associated with the parks was much narrower than the ideas that would later
define the romantic case for preservation. In both respects, these arguments
highlight the dominance of providential republicanism and the absence from
core land-use politics of ideas that would be conventional two generations
later.
In an 1883 debate over administration and funding of Yellowstone, the
threshold issue was whether any portion of federal public lands should remain in government ownership or, as Senator Ingalls of Kansas put it,
“[t]he best thing that the Government could do with Yellowstone National
Park is to survey it and sell it as other public lands are sold.”66 Ingalls’s
position expressed the larger idea that disbursing public lands to private
owners would carry westward the empire of liberty and wealth, while permanent government ownership meant monopoly and potential tyranny. Supporters of the parks did not deny that view as a general matter, but argued
instead that the parks should be exceptions. Yosemite was “for all public
purposes, worthless,”67 while Yellowstone beyond its geysers (already recognized as a potentially lucrative tourist destination) was “simply useless
. . . ‘mere leather and prunella.’” 68 These, it bears repeating, were the parks’
supporters. Their arguments presupposed that the “public purposes” that
defined the “worth” of most federal land were restricted to economic productivity, making the wild high country of the parks an anomaly whose preservation would subtract nothing from the priority of development.
Supporters’ praise for the parks expressed the same constraints, falling
far short of the fulsome language of later preservationists. Senator Vest
called Yellowstone “the great wonder-land of the world,” full of “great curiosities that exist nowhere else,”69 and Senator Conness of California praised
Yosemite for “some of the greatest wonders of the world.”70 These phrases,
though, should not be mistaken for a senatorial embrace of romantic epiph-

64
See id. at 1722 (statement of Sen. Teller) (“I claim that nothing is demanded by the
people in the Territories now that has not been conceded to all settlers in the new Territories.”).
65
CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2300 (1864).
66
14 CONG. REC. 3453, 3488 (1883).
67
CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2300 (1864) (statement of Sen. Conness).
68
14 CONG. REC. 3487 (1883) (statement of Sen. Vest).
69
14 CONG. REC. 3488 (1883).
70
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2300 (1864).
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any. The stress belongs on curiosities. The “republican park[s]”71 that the
Senate was prepared to offer Americans were one part spa, two parts circus,
and no part spiritualized nature. Conness emphasized the freakishness of
Yosemite’s giant sequoias, describing the incredulity that had met a crosssection of one tree at the London World’s Fair, where “the English who saw
it declared it to be a Yankee invention, made from beginning to end.”72 He
also insisted, “[t]here is no parallel, and can be no parallel for this measure,
for there is not . . . on earth just such a condition of things.”73 The very
oddness of the valley thus made its designation as a park sui generis and
compatible with the general principle of privatizing the public domain.
Advocates in these decades were beginning to craft arguments based in
progressive management and romantic epiphany, and to find audiences for
these understandings of nature, but they were still working against a pervasive backdrop of providential republicanism. President Hayes spoke in favor
of Schurz’s efforts to regulate timbering, warning that “a country can not
[sic] be stripped of its forests [without] the gravest consequences.”74 His
successor, Chester Arthur, sounded a similar note.75 The two presidents introduced conservationist ideas into the heart of political debate and marked
the issue as a point of conflict between an executive seeking a new mandate
to manage public lands in the name of utilitarian public interest and a Congress defending an older, privatizing conception of the public interest, whose
adherents now found themselves redefined as a regional faction. Even earlier, Frederick Law Olmsted had written a report to the California Legislature urging it to accept the grant of Yosemite, in which he argued that by
managing the most beautiful tracts of federal land for public recreation, the
United States could grant all its “republican” citizens the invigorating benefits of outdoors life and aesthetic contemplation that more hierarchical nations had reserved for their aristocrats.76 The progressive and romantic
understandings of the natural world and the human relation to it were available by the later nineteenth century, but as political language they were first
nascent, then embattled, and it was not until the end of the century that their
advocates could shape the law and, with it, the landscape.

71

14 CONG. REC. 3488 (1883) (statement of Sen. Vest).
CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2301 (1864).
73
Id.
74
Rutherford B. Hayes, President, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1877).
75
See Chester A. Arthur, President, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 4, 1882)
(“The condition of the forests of the country and the wasteful manner in which their destruction is taking place give cause for serious apprehension . . . . [T]heir total extinction can not
[sic] be long delayed unless better methods than now prevail shall be adopted for their protection and cultivation.”).
76
See Frederick Law Olmsted, The Yosemite Valley and Mariposa Big Tree Grove, in
AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARKS SYSTEM: THE CRITICAL DOCUMENTS 12, 20–22 (Larry M. Dilsaver ed., 1994) (1865).
72
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II. PROGRESSIVE MANAGEMENT
Two statutes, the 1897 organic act of the U.S. Forest Service and the
1916 counterpart for the National Park Service, crystallize the ideas of progressive management.77 Their instruments are federal retention and administration of land that would previously have been on track for privatization.
Their technique is managerial and scientific expertise. Their goal is the
greatest good of the greatest number across time. What that good was, and
how government should serve it, were the major themes of progressive management. The perspective of progressive management recast the nineteenth
century’s development policies as anachronistic, if not downright pernicious.
The touchstone of progressive management was conservation, the rational
use of resources to serve social ends; its antithesis was waste, which came to
mean use that undermined those ends.78 These ideas tied management of
natural resources into broader reform programs; they also made natural resources management a paradigm, sometimes an indispensable one, for those
programs.
Progressive management, like providential republicanism, appealed to
its adherents on several levels. Its core concepts, conservation and waste,
enabled reformers to unite a variety of social and natural-resource problems.
This account of problems and the response they required also strengthened
the case for an institutional program that many reformers already advocated:
a strong regulatory government at both the state and, especially, the national
level. Progressive management also appealed to its adherents’ search for
dignity and meaning: it elevated experts and managers to the status of indispensable guardians of the national interest, which gave them both an urgent
purpose and a claim on the regard of their fellows.
Although some of its advocates, such as Theodore Roosevelt, labored to
reconcile progressive management with the frontier legacy, in important
ways it was a rejection of providential republicanism. Reformers argued
that yeoman ownership and private management of natural resources failed
to sustain liberty and prosperity, and, in fact, caused crises of waste and
depletion. Their reforms took much of the country’s natural-resource wealth
out of the channels of privatization that had run richly since the end of the
eighteenth century and granted government a managerial role that, in the
providential republican imagination, looked like resurgent tyranny. Hence
the two approaches created and sustained competing constituencies and
competing versions of the country, which were on a collision course from
the start.

77
See Sundry Civil Appropriations Act of 1897, 30 Stat. 35 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 551 (2006)); An Act to Establish a Natural Park Service, Pub. L. No. 64-238, 39 Stat.
535 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
78
The use of these terms is discussed, with examples, infra Part II.A.
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A. The Core of Conservation
The National Park and Forest Service organic statutes expressed the
core of the idea of conservation. They established guiding purposes and
governance frameworks for new categories of land: acreage permanently retained in the federal public domain for production or recreation.79 According
to the statutes, national forests were to provide “a continuous supply of timber” and control downstream erosion and drought.80 The parks’ “fundamental purpose” was to “conserve the scenery and the natural and historic
objects and wild life therein . . . .”81 The land preserved was to be dedicated
to “enjoyment . . . such . . . as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment
of future generations.”82 These statutes expressly aimed to manage present
resources for undiminished future benefits, and took federal retention and
management as their means to this goal.
On their face, the two statutes’ purposes — economic production on the
one hand, beauty and recreation on the other — may seem quite distinct.
They have sometimes been cast as antagonists in accounts of this period,
their conflict crystallized in the famous dispute between the Sierra Club and
the Department of Interior over damming Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite
National Park.83 In fact, they were unified by the organizing concept of the
Progressive environmental imagination: conservation. The word’s meaning
was built around the core of rational resource management, but was considerably richer than that. Conservation implied ways of imagining both natural and social life as complex systems that required informed and intentional
management. It embraced a moral vision of a national community that could
meet and match those forces. Its advocates insisted that rational policy
could identify and achieve a common, national interest amid the clash of
particular interests.84 As Pinchot put it in a touchstone discussion,
79
Before the creation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872, land not retained as military
bases was in a steady process of allocation to states, settlers, and industrial interests (such as
railroads) under a variety of ongoing and one-off statutes. The President first acquired the
power to create federal forest reserves in 1891, by way of a scrap of language inserted into the
General Revision Act and discussed mainly after its passage in the fierce controversy that
followed President Harrison’s exercise of the authority. See GATES, supra note 56, at 565–69
(describing origin and early implementation of forest reservation power).
80
See 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2006).
81
Id. § 1.
82
Id.
83
See, e.g., RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 161–81 (3d ed.
1982) (describing the Hetch Hetchy dispute as a signal battle between wilderness-oriented
“preservationists” and development-minded “conservationists”).
84
See GIFFORD PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION 48–49 (1910). Pinchot
explained:

The conservation idea covers a wider range than the field of natural resources alone.
Conservation means the greatest good to the greatest number for the longest
time. . . . Conservation advocates the use of foresight, thrift, and intelligence in
dealing with public matters. . . . It proclaims the right and duty of the people to act
for the benefit of the people. Conservation demands the application of commonsense to the common problems for the common good.
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There is . . . no interest of the people to which the principles of
conservation do not apply . . . in the education of our people as
well as in forestry . . . to the body politic as well as to the earth and
its minerals . . . . It applies as much to the subject of good roads as
to waterways, and the training of our people in citizenship is as
germane to it as the productiveness of the earth.85
Conservation was partly defined by an antithesis, waste, an old word to
which conservationists gave a new sense.86 As we have seen, waste had
been used interchangeably with wilderness to mean undeveloped terrain, a
sense rooted in its Latin root, vastus, meaning empty or desolate. While use
of the word to denote a fruitless expenditure of energy or wealth was already
well established, in progressives’ hands this latter sense of waste became an
obsessive indictment of any system or process that failed to make maximally
productive use of its materials, whether those were minerals, trees, or human
bodies and energy.87 In progressive accounts, waste arose from a denial of
the insights of conservation. The sources of waste were indifference to the
complex effects of natural and social systems; defection from national community and purposes in favor of selfish personal interests; and absence of
rational public policy.88 Taken together, these waste-making attitudes represented failure to leave behind the mentality of the frontier or, alternatively,
to adapt it to new circumstances. Wasting a resource, for progressive reformers, meant using land, forests, or labor in ways that diminished their
health and productive activity. Conservation was the principle and technique of eliminating waste.
B. The Natural Resources Paradigm and Its Extension to Public Health
In natural-resource management, the canonical expression of conservation ideas came from Gifford Pinchot.89 Pinchot was the most visible representative of a network of foresters, engineers, and sportsmen who argued
that without rational policy and muscular enforcement, the country’s forests
would soon be cleared, its mines exhausted, its soil barren, and its rivers
Id.
85

Id. at 49–50.
See id. at 44 (giving a definition of conservation by its antithesis: “conservation stands
for the prevention of waste”).
87
See id. at 5–7 (lamenting “waste” in cases where resources are left undeveloped, as
with un-mined coal, and in cases where they are inefficiently consumed); id. at 7–10 (objecting
to “waste” of renewable resources such as soil fertility as well as non-renewable resources
such as coal); id. at 43 (noting that failure to develop a resource can be as much a source of
waste as poor use of it); id. at 45 (explaining that proper understanding of “waste” has at last
made possible human mastery over uses of resources). For applications of “waste” to human
rather than natural resources, see, for example, Woodrow Wilson, President, First Inaugural
Address (March 4, 1913), discussed infra Part II.B, and IRVING FISHER, REPORT ON NATIONAL
VITALITY: ITS WASTES AND CONSERVATION 2 (1909), which was prepared for the National
Conservation Commission.
88
See generally infra Part III.C.1–3.
89
See PINCHOT, supra note 84, at 43–50 (setting out principles of conservation).
86
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clogged with the sediment of erosion. The same arguments, as to forests in
particular, were presented to Congress as early as 1890 in a memorial from
the American Forestry Association, a critical body in the interlocking public
and professional development of these ideas.90 Already in 1891, the Interior
Department’s annual report to Congress announced the urgency of avoiding
upstream erosion in irrigation systems, warned that without timbering limits
“there will be little timber left to protect,” and urged that the President’s new
power to reserve timberlands be used to these aims.91
Conservation implied rational management of human beings as well as
nature. Theodore Roosevelt declared, “the health and vitality of our people
are at least as well worth conserving as their forests, waters, lands, and minerals,”92 and Charles Van Hise, a leading Progressive scholar of regulation,
concluded his landmark study entitled Conservation of Natural Resources
with a discussion of “The Conservation of Man Himself,” which focused on
public health.93 The 1909 National Conservation Commission report to Congress and the President, which unified a sweeping conservation agenda, included a Report on National Vitality: Its Wastes and Conservation, which
opened with this assertion: “the problem of conserving our natural resources
is part of another and greater problem — [sic] that of national efficiency
[which] depends not only on physical environment, but on social environment, and most of all on human vitality.”94 These formulations cast light on
the moral gravamen of conservation and its antithesis, waste. What the
Progressives warred against was not just failure to optimize use of the marginal unit of wood or coal, but spoliation of human bodies and energies.
Conservationists’ interest in human health made natural beauty and vigorous outdoor recreation essential elements of their program. As sanitation
laws saved Americans from the medical hazards of urban crowding, so parks
could preserve them from the mental strains and abrasions of loud, fastpaced neighborhoods and workplaces. From Frederick Law Olmsted in
1865 to John Muir in 1901, reformers argued that laborers and city dwellers
could repair themselves in restfully contemplating gorgeous landscapes.95
The management of nature and of society came together vividly in
Woodrow Wilson’s first inaugural address. Picking up the core themes of
90

See 21 CONG. REC. 2537 (1890).
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 14 (1891).
Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism, Speech at Osawatomie (Aug. 31, 1910),
reprinted in Theodore Roosevelt, THE NEW NATIONALISM 22 (1910).
93
See VAN HISE & LOOMIS HAVEMEYER, CONSERVATION OF OUR NATIONAL RESOURCES
514–23 (2d ed. 1930).
94
FISHER, supra note 87, at 2.
95
See Olmsted, supra note 76, at 20–22 (describing benefits to public mental health from
access of beauty). Muir documented a concomitant shift in public perception:
91
92

R
R

Thousands of tired nerve-shaken, over-civilized people are beginning to find out that
. . . parks and reservations are useful not only as fountains of timber and irrigating
rivers, but as fountains of life. . . . [T]hey are trying . . . to mix and enrich their own
little ongoings with those of Nature, and to get rid of rust and disease.
MUIR, supra note 45, at 1.
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conservation, Wilson described the nineteenth century’s legacy as both
“riches” and “inexcusable waste,” the latter in failure “to conserve the . . .
bounty of nature” and in “the human cost . . . of lives snuffed out, of energies overtaxed and broken.”96 Throughout the speech, images of neglected
forests and waters and “waste places unreclaimed” are interwoven with
those of sick, exhausted, and vulnerable bodies.97 The progressive responses
to such social waste — resource conservation, public-health regulation, and
labor laws — figured in Wilson’s language as forming a single remedy: “to
purify and humanize every process of our common life” by replacing shortsighted self-interest with a commitment that law shall “keep sound the society it serves.”98
C. Three Varieties of Moral Reform
Visions of moral renovation suffused reformers’ programs. Natural resources policy figured in distinct ways in Pinchot’s utilitarian rationality,
Roosevelt’s civic nationalism, and Weyl’s agenda of consumer uplift. For
each, the use of nature was a key to national character and a reference point
for larger political ideas.
1. The Humanitarianism of Utilitarian Rationality
For Pinchot, conservation of natural resources was part of a program of
moral reform that aimed at persuading Americans to look beyond selfish
interests and pursue the prosperity of the present national community and
future generations. Written into both the Forest Service and Park Service
organic acts, this idea animated Pinchot’s argument, which was built around
denunciation of “short-sighted[ness]”99 and a call to “make ourselves . . .
responsible for [the country’s] future.”100 “The conservation movement,”
Pinchot wrote, “is calling the attention of the American people to the fact
that they are trustees.”101 Conservation policy aimed to serve all Americans’
interest in material well-being, making “the difference between prosperity
and poverty, health and sickness, ignorance and education, well-being and
misery.”102 Identifying with this collective interest required what Pinchot
called public spirit, which he defined, in opposition to selfishness, as “patriotism in action [and] the application of Christianity to the commonwealth.”103 Conservation was both a technocratic agenda and the touchstone

96

Wilson, supra note 87.
Id.
98
Id.
99
PINCHOT, supra note 84, at 4.
100
Id. at 20.
101
Id. at 75–76.
102
Id. at 88.
103
Id. at 96.
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of an ethic in which the good of all would become the object of each citizen’s patriotic loyalty.
There were two distinct moral standpoints in Pinchot’s account. The
first was that of the citizen devoted to the common good. But this was necessarily an abstract loyalty, because Pinchot believed that serving the public
interest demanded regulatory expertise that ordinary citizens lacked, and a
scale of decision-making that only large institutions achieved. In practice,
the commonweal required the engineering of systems, whether forests,
schools, or markets. Thus Pinchot’s account implied a second moral standpoint, that of the public-spirited expert manager qualified to interpret and
implement the public interest. Conservation of natural and human resources
was both a reformist program and a call for renovation of the national spirit,
a new moral regard for all one’s fellow citizens and for future generations. It
uneasily united two constituencies: the democratic public that progressive
conservationists urged to embrace the common good and the elite managers
whom conservationists expected to identify and pursue that good.
2. The Conservation of Civic Virtue
Conservationists such as Roosevelt wanted citizens to be committed to
the long-term interest of the whole country, and they wondered whether that
civic spirit was possible in their time. An anxiety rippled through their cohort of elite reformers: that a prosperous, peaceful, and sanitary democracy
would prove self-undermining because citizens would grow indifferent to
national ideals, the public interest, and the well-being of future generations.104 Such small-spirited Americans might hurry to consume the country’s natural resources, leaving it geopolitically vulnerable, as Pinchot
warned;105 they might fall into the interest-driven class conflict that
Roosevelt feared;106 or they might simply give up all great initiative, whether
political or industrial, and “rot by inches, like China.”107 What united these
concerns was not so much a theory as a mood and a pattern of fears, but
those, at least, are fairly clear. For these reformers, the United States had
been built in a spirit of individualism that was not simply selfish, but also
daring and oriented to high ideals. The decline of that spirit would mean the
end of American greatness and might even make national unity impossible.
104
See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM FROM BRYAN TO FDR 196–212
(1955) (describing contemporary journalists’ focus on pervasive selfishness, corruption, and
indifference to ideals and the public interest); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER
1877–1920, at 56–66 (1967) (describing anxiety over loss of imagined “purity” and “unity”
and wish to reclaim them).
105
See PINCHOT, supra note 84, at 17–20 (writing on the threat of national decline from
heedless consumption).
106
See THEODORE ROOSEVELT, Fellow-Feeling as a Political Factor, in THE STRENUOUS
LIFE 58, 66–68 (1901) (portraying class and occupational segregation as a source of civic
division).
107
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, The Strenuous Life, in THE STRENUOUS LIFE, supra note 106,
at 3, 7.
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Some, Roosevelt among them, saw answers in war and imperial
projects.108 At the same time, the search was on for civilian modes of character-building adventure, the famous moral equivalents of war.109 Already
established in Roosevelt’s call for a “strenuous life” lived in search of adventure, this ideal was soon worked into the defense of outdoor recreation.
According to the 1928 Report of the National Conference on Outdoor Recreation, with the closing of the frontier and rise of industry, “the individualism
of the pioneer has been submerged in collective enterprise.”110 In such circumstances, recreation was “a needful social force” and source of “physical
vigor, moral strength, and clean simplicity of mind.”111 Nature, then, could
be the ligament that joined American life across its eras, giving access to old
qualities in new times. For the American landscape to play this role, however, it would have to be managed appropriately: individual daring and adventurousness were to be, just a bit paradoxically, products of an age of
planning and administration, “needful social forces” to be husbanded like
bodily health, timber stocks, and fossil fuel.
Roosevelt also saw forests and parks as civic commons where Americans could overcome the class segregation of urban, industrial life, which he
believed exacerbated pernicious social conflict. In these commons, Americans could mingle and share projects across their divisions, developing the
quality that Roosevelt called “fellow-feeling,” the germ of the utilitarian
public spirit that he and Pinchot both praised as a patriotism for their time.112
This was the civic value of the “free camping grounds for the ever-increasing numbers of men and women who have learned to find rest, health, and
recreation in the splendid forests and flower-clad meadows of our
mountains.”113
108

See id. at 20–22. In describing the war in the Philippines, Roosevelt wrote:

[I]f we do our duty aright in the Philippines, we will add to that national renown
which is the highest and finest part of national life . . . [I]f we seek merely swollen,
slothful ease and ignoble peace . . . then the bolder and stronger peoples will pass us
by, and will win for themselves the domination of the world. . . . [I]t is only through
strife, through hard and dangerous endeavor, that we shall ultimately win the goal of
true national greatness.
Id. at 19–21.
109
See generally WILLIAM JAMES, The Moral Equivalent of War, in WRITINGS, 1902–1910,
at 1281, 1281–93 (1987).
110
Chauncy Hamlin, Introduction, in REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON OUTDOOR RECREATION 1, 1 (1928).
111
Id. at 2–3.
112
See ROOSEVELT, supra note 106, at 78–80. Roosevelt argued:
The only way to avoid the growth of these evils [class conflict] is . . . the creation of
conditions which will permit mutual understanding and fellow-feeling between the
members of different classes . . . if the men can be mixed together in some way that
will loosen the class or caste bonds and put each on his merits as an individual man,
there is certain to be a regrouping independent of caste lines.
Id.
113
See Theodore Roosevelt, President, Message Communicated to the Two Houses of
Congress at the Beginning of the First Session of the Fifty-Seventh Congress (Dec. 3, 1901), in
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3. The Humanism of Socialized Consumption
Progressive conservation took a different direction in Walter Weyl’s argument for “the socialization of consumption.”114 As Eric Foner notes,
“during the Progressive era . . . a consumer definition of freedom — access
to the cornucopia of goods made available by modern capitalism — began to
supplant an older version centered on economic and political sovereignty.”115 In contrast to Roosevelt, Weyl was sharply critical of individualism and the frontier ethos, which he portrayed not as virtues to be
transformed for new circumstances, but as defects to be overcome. Indeed,
he seized on the providential republican trope that geography was destiny,
but reversed the value of the plenteous frontier, arguing: “It made America
atomic. It led automatically to a loose political coherence and to a structureless economic system.”116 Thus the symptoms of exploitation and inequality, “[t]he trust, the hundred-millionaire, and the slum were latent in the
land which the American people in their first century of freedom were to
subjugate.”117 For Weyl, the Progressive embrace of social regulation, “an
energetic campaign of human conservation,”118 brought not the potential enervation that Roosevelt feared, but pure progress from the destructive chaos
of the frontier.119
For Weyl, “the socialization of consumption” had a qualitative goal: to
improve the character and experience of citizens by guiding their consumption. This implied social provision of public goods was to offer experiences
that Americans could not have enjoyed individually. Parks were a key example for Weyl; but here, in contrast to Roosevelt’s thinking, parks mattered
for the satisfaction they provided for individuals, not for their capacity to
support civic virtues.120 Regulated consumption should also enable ordinary
Americans to explore a new dimension of satisfactions: the leisure and selfcultivation previously reserved to elites would now be available to everyADDRESSES AND PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, 1902–1904, at 284, 310
(1904).
114
WALTER E. WEYL, THE NEW DEMOCRACY: AN ESSAY ON CERTAIN POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC TENDENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES 320 (1912).
115
ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 146–47 (1998).
116
WEYL, supra note 114, at 23.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 323. Weyl also wrote of his social vision, “the democracy,” that “[t]he most
elemental phase of this social policy is conservation,” id. at 320, and, “[t]he conservation of
human resources is a step towards [sic] the equalization of the chances of life and health of
the citizens,” id. at 326. Weyl, unlike some progressives, was skeptical of the concept’s value,
arguing that it took currency from “the vogue of the analogous policy of the conservation of
natural resources” but was too narrow to describe the social policy’s goal of improving the
population. See id. at 320.
119
Weyl wrote acidly of the time when “the struggle for money and land waxed fiercer
and fiercer . . . and men wasted and garnered and laughed and fought, as the continent was
conquered.” Id. at 28–29.
120
See id. at 332 (“The state can also socialize consumption by furnishing a larger number
of . . . those commodities and services which are furnished to the citizens in their individual
capacity freely, though the citizens pay for them in their collective capacity.”).
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one.121 This was no simple gain; Americans would have to learn to use leisure well, developing their minds and character free of the immediate need
to support life and provide shelter. Leisure thus presented a cultural
challenge.122
D. Conservation and the Claims to Public Interest in the
New Nationalism
Conservation was central to Theodore Roosevelt’s New Nationalism.
Roosevelt called for recovering, in a large-scale and complex economy, the
distributive ideal of rewarding effort, talent, and initiative, all qualities that
he associated, at least rhetorically, with frontier settlement. Roosevelt’s vision of economic regulation aimed at “national efficiency,” which he called
“the principle of conservation widely applied.”123 Elaborating on the central
place of conservation in his program, Roosevelt explained in his presidential
introduction to the massive 1909 report of the National Conservation Commission, that “[t]he policy of conservation is perhaps the most typical example of the general policies which this government has made peculiarly its
own.”124 Roosevelt’s examples of conservation-modeled regulatory policy
included antitrust, control of corporate involvement in politics, and, above
all, laws to deny corporations “unregulated control of the means of production and the necessaries of life.”125
The aim of “national efficiency” was to deploy all productive forces,
human beings above all, without waste. This included a principle of distributive fairness: each person’s success should correspond to (1) her effort and
talent and (2) her contribution to the public welfare. A proper regulatory
regime would calibrate reward by these principles. Roosevelt called this
principle “freedom of opportunity” or “equality of opportunity,” and invoked it throughout his account of the relation between conservation and the
larger ideal of national efficiency.126
121

See id. at 332.
See id. at 333.
123
Roosevelt, supra note 92, at 26. He also wrote that “conservation is the great fundamental basis for national efficiency.” Theodore Roosevelt, Special Message of the President,
in 1 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONSERVATION COMMISSION 1, 4 (1909). In the same message,
Roosevelt explained that “[n]ational efficiency is the result of natural resources well handled,
of freedom of opportunity for every man, and of the inherent capacity, trained ability, knowledge, and will, collectively and individually, to use that opportunity.” Id.
124
Id. at 3.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 3–4; see also Roosevelt, supra note 92, at 9–11 (“[E]very man will have a fair
chance to make of himself all that in him lies; to reach the highest point to which his capacities, unassisted by special privilege of his own and unhampered by the special privileges of
others, can carry him, and to get for himself and his family substantially what he has earned.”).
In his 1901 annual address to Congress, Roosevelt declared that “[t]he chief factor in the
success of each man — wage-worker, farmer, and capitalist alike — must ever be the sum
total of his own individual qualities and abilities.” Roosevelt, supra note 113, at 300. In his
“Special Message,” Roosevelt also proposed that “[t]he man who serves the community
greatly should be greatly rewarded by the community; as there is great inequality of service, so
122
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Achieving “national efficiency” was imperative for Roosevelt not just
because reconciling distributive justice with aggregate productivity was theoretically attractive, but also because it promised a solution to labor strife
and political division. In “The New Nationalism” and other conservation
addresses, national efficiency and equality of opportunity were protagonists
on a landscape of brutally clashing interests, labor and capital above all.127
Roosevelt was personally horrified by class conflict and saw in it a basic
threat to social order.128 He insisted that, for all the inequity and social waste
of industrial capitalism, an ideal reconciliation of interests was achievable
within that economic order.129
Conservation of natural resources served as synecdoche for this larger
ideal. Renewable resources such as forests seemed to embody the gains to
be won from expert public management relative to the hurried clear-cuts of
the mid-nineteenth century. Private extractions from the public domain
presented a concrete picture of selfish exploitation, a vivid antithesis to public-spirited management. In contrast to the notorious difficulties of economic regulation, such as formally reconciling free choice with substantive
opportunity and distinguishing distributive fairness from rent-seeking politics,130 the efficient management of natural resources in the national interest
seemed exactly the example to persuade the reformer and his audience alike
that conservation, generalized as “national efficiency,” could reconcile competing interests and produce a just version of industrial, democratic
capitalism.
The paradigm of natural resources may have had another, related advantage for the idea of national efficiency. It is often observed of progressive reformers, Roosevelt in particular, that while the public interest was
their touchstone, fractious partisan politics left them impatient or dis-

there must be great inequality of reward; but no man and no set of men should be allowed to
play the game of competition with loaded dice.” Roosevelt, supra note 123, at 3.
127
In his 1901 annual address to Congress, Roosevelt declared:

R

The most vital problem with which this country . . . has to deal, is the problem which
has for one side the betterment of social conditions, moral and physical, in large
cities, and for another side the effort to deal with that tangle of far-reaching questions which we group together when we speak of ‘labor.’
Roosevelt, supra note 113, at 299–300.
128
See ROOSEVELT, supra note 106, at 66-68.
129
See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877
469–80 (1989) (discussing role of the idea of public interest among progressive reformers);
SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 1890–1920, at 261–76 (1959) (discussing the role of natural resources
in the progressive ideal of public interest).
130
See, e.g., MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900–1933, at 7–11 (1990) (discussing competing ideas of the
nature of the industrial economy and the appropriate role of government in its management);
ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
290–314 (2001) (surveying the persistent normative complexity and ambiguity in legal regulation of labor contracts in the northern United States).
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gusted.131 They nonetheless confronted a politics riven by clashes of economic interest and social vision. These always threatened to confound the
New Nationalist ideal of an all-reconciling public interest. Resource conservation was a paradigm case in which expert managers could preside over
mute landscapes, seemingly achieving governance without politics, in the
name of a public interest that they had considerable liberty to define. The
model of government as benign and fully informed manager was easier to
maintain in proprietorship of land than as mediator of always-clashing economic interests and ideological programs.
Progressive conservationists’ commitments were shaped by ambivalence about democracy’s fidelity to popular will and utilitarianism’s egalitarianism of satisfactions. Their thought had a recurrent double character. On
the one hand, their lodestar was the greatest good for the greatest number.
On the other, they believed that only individuals of refined judgment and
strong character could be expected to embrace this principle and support a
government that promoted it. Democratic will might set the direction of
national life, but only experts in natural and social systems could steer the
course. Ordinary people were pervasively crude in their tastes and judgment, but access to the experience that conservationists most valued, such as
outdoor adventure and appreciation of beauty, might make Americans more
worthy of the democracy whose final law they, unsettlingly, represented.
This double character seems to have helped conservation to be at once two
things: a practical program of reform for a newly complex social and economic order and a vehicle for a status-marking version of refined taste,
which gave cultural authority to a certain upper-class attitude toward the
outdoors. Those who devised this marriage of scientific and aesthetic management thus created an account of industrial, democratic modernity, and of
the role of government in responding to it, in which they played an indispensable role as both manipulators and interpreters of nature. The conservation
movement advanced a democratic ideal that kept a central place for an elite
of both knowledge and taste.
III. ROMANTIC EPIPHANY
Beauty and outdoor recreation figured in progressive management as
means to public health, civic virtue, and “socialized consumption.” In the
same period, natural beauty played a much more central role in another addition to public language: the attitude of romantic epiphany. Its core idea was
that certain encounters with nature were revelatory, disclosing essential but
obscured facts about one’s identity and place in the world. This intuition had
long been around as a literary, aesthetic, or sentimental delectation, but two
changes helped bring it into environmental public language. One was fed131
Eric Foner quotes approvingly H.L. Mencken’s quip about Roosevelt: “He didn’t believe in democracy; he believed simply in government.” FONER, supra note 115, at 154–55
(1998).
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eral retention of public lands, including national forests and the first parks,
which created a forum in which arguments about beauty figured in concrete
management decisions. The other was the rise of the Sierra Club, a romantic
social movement with an agenda for management of public lands.
A. Personal Epiphany and Mutual Education
The Sierra Club transformed the literary and personal register of romantic epiphany into a form of sociability and, through the social movement that
shared it, a public and political language. In this project, Club members
made good use of their organization’s icon, the nature writer and parks publicist John Muir, who was president of the Club from its founding in 1892
until his death in 1914. The Club’s approach to the California high country
was composed around Muir’s writings, which formed a kind of field guide to
epiphany.
Muir wrote travel narratives centering on description of landscapes,
particularly those of the Sierra Nevada. At reliable intervals, the prose broke
into soaring evocations of delight in nature’s beauty and announcements that
this delight was morally instructive, even a form of revelation. These
passages conveyed a cluster of ideas. Everyday life was spilled out in instrumental activity and drab settings, which left the eyes dull and the mind
blunt.132 In the most spectacular natural settings — mountain peaks, endless
vistas, and sheer rock faces — something entirely different broke through in
the mind: wonder, awe, even ecstasy.133 This experience revealed, by a kind
of overwhelming intuition, that both the world and the human mind that
could be moved by it were morally good, formed to harmonies that Muir
frequently compared to mystical intuitions of divinity.134 Encounters with
nature’s most dramatic landscapes restored the harmony and vitality of the
mind and brought a feeling of fraternity with all living things.135 These ex132
See MUIR, OUR NATIONAL PARKS, supra note 45, at 3–5 (describing the parks’ beneficiaries as “tired, nerve-shaken, over-civilized,” suffering from “the stupefying effects of the
vice of over-industry,” and “choked with care like clocks full of dust”).
133
See JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 153 (1911) (“Never before had I
seen so glorious a landscape, so boundless an affluence of sublime mountain beauty . . . . I
shouted and gesticulated in a wild burst of ecstasy . . . .”); id. at 175 (“[T]he whole body
seems to feel beauty when exposed to it as it feels the camp-fire or sunshine, entering not by
the eyes alone, but equally through all one’s flesh like radiant heat, making a passionate ecstatic pleasurable glow not explainable.”).
134
See id. at 129 (“South Dome . . . seems full of thought, clothed with living light, no
sense of dead stone about it, all spiritualized, neither heavy looking nor light, steadfast in
serene strength like a god.”); id. at 169–70 (exclaiming that droplets of water passing from
“form to form, beauty to beauty, ever changing, never resting, all are speeding on with love’s
enthusiasm, singing with the stars the eternal song of creation”); id. at 124 (“The whole landscape glows like a human face in a glory of enthusiasm, and the blue sky, pale around the
horizon, bends peacefully down over all like one vast flower.”).
135
See John Muir, A Wind Storm in the Forests, reprinted in AMERICAN EARTH: ENVIRONMENTAL WRITING SINCE THOREAU 93–95 (Bill McKibben ed., 2008) (reporting as the epiphany of a morning spent in a wind-lashed treetop that relations among all things in nature are
“no struggle . . . but rather an invincible gladness as remote from exultation as from fear”); id.
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periences were, in a sense, the birthright of sentient beings, but everyday life
cast them in shadow and worse.
Such ideas had enjoyed wide literary circulation for more than a century, accompanied by various philosophical apparatuses, not least in three
figures whom Muir expressly treated as forebears: Wordsworth, Emerson,
and Thoreau.136 Public receptivity was also prepared by the prominence in
visual culture of spectacular landscape paintings that explicitly invoked the
sublime, aesthetic touchstone of romantic epiphany.137 Nineteenth-century
American literature featured a line of quasi-pantheist poets running back
from Walt Whitman to William Cullen Bryant, who declared “[t]he groves
were God’s first temples.”138
Muir’s widely read books and magazines worked these ideas, and accompanying styles of nature description, into instruction in experience:
Muir’s writing enacted a journey on foot over spectacular landscapes; a precise, appreciative, even reverent way of seeing the landscape as one moved
across it; and a register of overwhelming yet exquisite emotional response
with a benign interpretation latent in it. For example, in his major work of
publicity for parks preservation and tourism, Our National Parks, Muir devoted a number of pages to detailing the access trail to Yosemite’s Glacier
Monument, including details appropriate to a trail guidebook.139 After considerable detail on the route to the peak of this granite dome and a detailed
account of the view one might see from the top, he proposed that “[t]o an
observer . . . in the midst of such scenery, getting glimpses of the thoughts of
at 97 (“After tracing the Sierra streams . . . learning their language and forms in detail, we may
at length hear them chanting all together in one grand anthem, and comprehend them all in
clear inner vision.”).
136
See MUIR, supra note 45, at 131–36 (describing a visit with Emerson in Yosemite,
suggesting that New England transcendentalism was exhausted and must be renewed in the
West, and ending with a recollection of a later visit to Emerson’s grave); DONALD WORSTER,
PASSION FOR NATURE: THE LIFE OF JOHN MUIR 160–61, 336–37 (2008) (describing Muir’s
relation to Wordsworth, including a pilgrimage to the poet’s grave at Grasmere).
137
See Angela Miller, The Fate of Wilderness in American Landscape Art: The Dilemmas
of ‘Nature’s Nation’, in AMERICAN WILDERNESS: A NEW HISTORY 91 (Michael Lewis ed.,
2007) (describing American landscape painters’ treatments of wilderness in the nineteenth century); see generally SIMON SCHAMA, LANDSCAPE AND MEMORY (1995) (discussing the European development of sublimity as a feature of landscape aesthetics); see also EDMUND BURKE,
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF THE SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL
39–40, 64–70 (James T. Boulton ed., 1958) (1757) (discussing the visual characteristics tending to induce sublimity); IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 109–14 (James Creed
Meredith trans., 1952) (1790) (describing sublimity as providing a glimpse of the rational
will’s freedom from physical determination).
138
WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT, A Forest Hymn, in POEMS 39, 39 (1836).
139
Muir wrote:

R

At first sight it seems sternly inaccessible, but a good climber will find that it may be
scaled on the south side . . . . [Y]ou pass through a dense bryanthus-fringed grove of
mountain hemlock . . . and . . . step abruptly out of the tree shadows and mossy leafy
softness upon a bare porphyry pavement . . . . In making the ascent, one finds that
the curve of the base rapidly steepens, until one is in danger of slipping; but feldspar
crystals, two or three inches long, that have been weathered into relief, afford slight
footholds.
MUIR, supra note 45, at 87–88.
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God, the day seems endless, the sun stands still. . . . One day is as a thousand years, a thousand years as one day, and while yet in the flesh you enjoy
immortality.”140 This prescription for rapture was followed immediately by
a recommended route for descending from the peak.141 To read Muir was to
begin learning to make such experience one’s own. It was nature writing as
both aesthetic and practical instruction for a social movement of heartfelt
high-country tourism.
The Club’s members continued that education for one another. They
pursued epiphany en masse, in summertime high-country camps of hundreds, from which smaller expeditions set out for nearby peaks.142 They understood Muir’s accounts of backcountry tourism to have inducted them into
a new way of experiencing nature. Admirers described him as “a prophet[ ]
and interpreter of nature,” who had trained others, as the favored metaphor
had it, to see through his eyes.143 In addition to their annual expeditions,
Club members’ great vehicle of mutual education was the Sierra Club Bulletin, which published continuously from 1895. It featured vivid and often
emotional accounts of large, small, and solo expeditions, and spectacular
photographs of the Sierra Nevada.
Contributors to the Bulletin described their high-country expeditions as
full of small epiphanies and glimpses of the sacred. The vitality and moral
clarity that natural beauty disclosed restored them for ordinary life.144
Marion Randall, a longtime club member, wrote in a typical passage that, on
an outing, “[f]or a little while you have dwelt close to the heart of things
. . . and in the whispering silences of the forest you have thought to hear the
voice of Him who ‘flies upon the wings of the wind.’” 145 Much more than
Muir, whose frequent solitude was part of his charisma, Club members in
these early writings presented Sierra Club expeditions as enabling uniquely
authentic social relations, unburdened by the conventional roles and the so140

Id. at 92–93.
Id. at 93–95.
142
See Marion Randall, Some Aspects of a Sierra Club Outing, 5 SIERRA CLUB BULL.,
1905, at 221, 221–28 (describing the logistics of a Sierra Club expedition).
143
See William Frederic Bade, To Higher Sierras, 10 SIERRA CLUB BULL., 1916–1919, at
38, 40 (counting Muir among “prophets and interpreters of nature” and predicting that
“[t]housands and thousands, hereafter, who go to the mountains, streams, and canons of California will choose to see them through the eyes of John Muir, and they will see more deeply
because they see with his eyes”); Notable Books in Brief Review: John Muir’s Account of His
Historic Thousand-Mile Walk to the Gulf and Other Recent Publications, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1917, at BR4 (“[M]any who have sought a vision of truth beneath the surface of nature have
found it through the eyes of John Muir.”); Benjamin Ide Wheeler, John Muir, Doctor of Laws,
University of California, (honorary degree), reprinted in 10 SIERRA CLUB BULL., 1916–1919,
at 24, 24 (calling Muir “uniquely gifted to interpret unto other men [nature’s] mind and
ways”).
144
See Helen M. Gompertz, A Tramp to Mt. Lyell, 1 SIERRA CLUB BULL., 1893–1896, at
136, 141 (referring to “[h]ours pass[ing] like moments” in “this sacred spot”); John R. Glascock, A California Outing, 1 SIERRA CLUB BULL., 1893–1896, at 147, 161 (“We . . . learned to
interpret and love the ‘various language’ in which nature speaks to the children of men . . . .
We were acolytes in the grand temple of the eternal.”).
145
Randall, supra note 142, at 227–28.
141
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cial and ideological divisions of everyday life.146 It was a convention of
Bulletin writing that, in the mountains, individuals could see one another
face to face, their genuine qualities shining through the detritus of habit that
obscured them in the lowlands.147 In contrast to more civic ambitions of
progressive management, the Sierra Club’s members sought perfect respite
from an imperfect world, not civic renewal but personal restoration, in which
the projects and distinctions of ordinary life fell away for a few days or
weeks.
B. The Appeal of Romantic Epiphany
Each version of environmental imagination took some of its power
from what it helped its adherents to deny. Providential republicanism rejected “tyranny” from above the community of political equals and constraints from the outside, such as indigenous land claims. Progressive
conservationists defined themselves against selfishness, the fissure of social
life into competing classes and interest groups, and the lassitude of prosperous ease. Adherents of both camps interpreted the natural world as inviting,
even demanding, their moral stance. Nature needed to be developed by free
settlers, its boundless potential brought to fruit under their tools, or it needed
experts to manage its complex systems.
Romantic epiphany offered its adherents an identity defined by two
contrasts. First, it offered an escape from feeling that the world was drab
and wearying, gray and flat, in a word, disenchanted. This is how Muir
often portrayed life’s less charismatic places and tasks. Muir was at pains to
contrast the experience of the mountains with the dominant tone in “these
hot, dim, strenuous times . . . [when people are] choked with care like
clocks full of dust, laboriously doing so much good . . . they are no longer
good for themselves.”148 In the mountains was “[n]o pain . . . no dull empty
hours, no fear of the past, no fear of the future.”149 Those who sought solace
in the mountains often sought what they found lacking in ordinary life:
something transcendent, benign, and both immanent in nature and accessible
in themselves. The “holier spirit” that Robert Sterling Yard identified with
the parks was haunted by contrast with the profane world;150 without a view
of nature that gave its “temples” near-mystical significance, only the profane might have remained.
Romantic epiphany’s portrayal of nature also denied another image of
“Nature,” as “red in tooth and claw,”151 a scene of a relentless struggle for
146
See Glascock, supra note 144, at 161 (“The varnish of civilization was rubbed off, and
the true strata of individual organism developed.”).
147
See, e.g., id.
148
MUIR, supra note 45, at 3.
149
MUIR, supra note 133, at 91.
150
ROBERT STERLING YARD, THE BOOK OF THE NATIONAL PARKS 20–21 (1919).
151
LORD ALFRED TENNYSON, IN MEMORIAM A.H.H. 60 (1900). The poet contrasts a view
of nature as a chaotic and violent struggle for survival with one that finds divine meaning in it.
The deceased friend to whom the poem is dedicated was one “Who trusted God was love
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survival. This latter view, which was often taken to be Darwin’s, threatened
to extend to social life and make traditional moral views of either nature or
society obsolete and naı̈ve. Moral and natural harmony was the great lesson
of Muir’s intuition. Describing a morning spent atop a Douglas spruce that
he had climbed to observe the drama of a windstorm, Muir reflected of this
natural violence: “We hear much nowadays concerning the universal struggle for existence, but no struggle in the common meaning of the word was
manifest here . . . but rather an invincible gladness as remote from exultation
as from fear.”152 Violence might be one of nature’s basic facts, but its meaning resided in a larger harmony that an attuned observer could perceive.
The engagement with evolutionary theory was even more explicit in the
work of Sierra Club co-founder and longtime officer Joseph Le Conte. A
professor of geology at Berkeley, Le Conte devoted much of his career to
arguing that evolution was compatible with theism because nature’s patterns
bespoke the orderly mind of God, with its highest expression in the human
capacity to appreciate the beauty and harmony of all lesser forms.153 The
world was thus at once natural and divine, and humanity both continuous
with nature and apart from it, our special status exemplified in the aesthetic
experience that brought nature, through its highest expression in the human
mind, to self-consciousness and to consciousness of God.154 Le Conte answered an atheistic interpretation of evolution with “a God immanent, a God
resident in Nature” so that “the phenomena of Nature are . . . objectified
modes of divine thought.”155 Apprehending this relation, he contended,
would enable believers to “return home to our inner higher life.”156 It was
by understanding themselves as the highest expressions of Nature, “gestative mother of spirit,”157 that people could turn to their role as “interpreter[s] of Nature.”158 Le Conte’s highest human activity, to apprehend
and interpret the beauty of nature, had unmistakable harmony with the
Club’s merger of aesthetic and spiritual concerns and Muir’s promise of a

indeed/And love Creation’s final law/Tho’ Nature, red in tooth and claw/With ravine/shriek’d
against his creed.” Id.
152
MUIR, supra note 135, at 89, 95.
153
See JOSEPH LE CONTE, RELIGION AND SCIENCE 269–81 (1875) (arguing that divinity
expresses itself throughout nature, with increasing individuation, culminating in human
consciousness).
154
Le Conte explained:

R

[I]n plants and animals, spirit is deeply submerged, and, as it were, drowned in
Nature, and in perfect darkness. In man alone, spirit appears above the surface and
emerges into the light. It looks downward upon Nature; it looks around upon other
entities like itself; it looks upward to the heavens above. It rises out of Nature,
above Nature, and becomes the interpreter of Nature.
Id. at 281.
155
JOSEPH LE CONTE, EVOLUTION AND ITS RELATION
(1888) (emphasis in original).
156
Id. at 285.
157
Id. at 306.
158
LE CONTE, supra note 153, at 281.

TO

RELIGIOUS THOUGHT 282–83
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this-worldly homecoming for those haunted by the suspicion that life was an
arena of meaningless struggle.
C. Public Lands and Public Language
Despite its members’ ambivalence about whether their high-country
“socialist’s Utopia”159 had bearing on the world below, the Club was intensely worldly in working for preservation of the open lands where expeditions and epiphanies happened. Sierra Club meetings were devoted as early
as 1895 to support for national forests, and, in the decade before World War
One, the Bulletin dedicated increasing space to forest management and parks
policy.160 In 1912, it ran a series of technical reports on prospects for increased parks funding and unified management of the parks system under a
single federal agency (which Congress created in 1916).161 Editorials in the
same year placed the Club squarely in the midst of public-lands politics,
staking out positions on creation of a Bureau of National Parks (for), expansion of Sequoia National Park (for), increased funding for Yosemite National
Park (for), and development of Hetch Hetchy Valley for San Francisco’s municipal water supply (emphatically against).162 A movement founded in devotion to aesthetic and spiritual experiences of nature had become a major
participant in land-use politics.
From its early years, the Club’s leaders worked to set their views about
the value of nature in productive relation to the utilitarian language of progressive management. In a representative missive to state governors attending a 1908 presidential conference on natural resource conservation, they
presented:
[O]ur strong sense of the paramount value of scenic beauty
among our natural resources. The moral and physical welfare of a
nation is not dependent alone upon bread and water. Comprehending these primary necessities is the deeper need for recreation
and that which satisfies also the esthetic sense . . . an ever present
human desire. Our . . . wealth of natural beauty . . . is an untaxed
heritage . . . whose influence upon the life of the nation, physi-

159

Randall, supra note 142, at 222.
See, e.g., F.E. Olmsted, Fire and the Forest — The Theory of “Light Burning,” 8
SIERRA CLUB BULL., 1911–1912, at 43, 43–47 (discussing methods of fire control on public
lands); J. Horace McFarland, Are National Parks Worth While? 8 SIERRA CLUB BULL.,
1911–1912, at 236, 236–39 (praising the parks as balm for “times when the tired spirit seeks a
wider space for change and rest” but lamenting the absence of any unified policy or federal
body devoted to management of the parks).
161
See National Parks, 8 SIERRA CLUB BULL., 1911–1912, at 217–36 (collecting various
updates on parks management, funding, and prospects for legislation establishing a unified
management system).
162
See Editorials, 8 SIERRA CLUB BULL., 1911–1912, at 205–07.
160
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cally, morally, mentally, is inestimable, and whose preservation is
the greatest service that one generation can render to another.163
All the themes of conservation are present in this passage: treating beauty as
an aspect of resource management; promoting the public welfare; and honoring trusteeship across generations. At the same time, the Club’s utilitarian
language does not subsume its distinctly Romantic perspective. Material
welfare figures here as an incident of a “deeper need” for recreation and
“esthetic” satisfaction, which for Club members meant the experiences they
described as spiritually revelatory and restorative. In this context, the
“mental” and “moral influence” that the letter ascribes to natural beauty
also evokes the benefits of epiphany. This is a departure from the publichealth arguments of reformers such as Olmsted, who had praised Yosemite
for the mental relaxation it brought overstressed visitors.164
The distinctive language that the Club pioneered was soon at the center
of public conversation about the parks. Romantic epiphany joined and frequently superseded the language of conservation and recreation. While serving as director of public education for the recently formed National Park
Service, Robert Sterling Yard argued that while all manner of outdoors
spaces provided recreational opportunity,
the national parks are far more than recreational areas. They are
the supreme examples. They are the gallery of masterpieces. Here
the visitor enters in a holier spirit. Here is inspiration . . . . The
spirit of the great places brooks nothing short of silent reverence
. . . . It is the hour of the spirit. One returns to daily living with a
springier step, a keener vision, and a broader horizon for having
worshipped at the shrine of the Infinite.165
This is not the language of Roosevelt, Pinchot, or Weyl. It is John Muir’s
account of nature’s meaning (or, more exactly, the meaning of nature’s most
spectacular places), carried through the social movement of the Sierra Club,
and serving here as public justification and guiding principle for a major
area of public lands policy. A new language was in place, distinct from
progressive management and a world away from the Senate’s parks debates
fifty years earlier. For nearly fifty years following its ascendance, romantic
epiphany shared dominance of environmental language and imagination
with providential republicanism and progressive management. Then came
the changes that ushered in the modern era of environmental lawmaking.

163
Sierra Club statement submitted to Presidential Conference on the Conservation of
Natural Resources, reprinted in 6 SIERRA CLUB BULL., 1906–1908, at 318.
164
Depending on their purpose, Club advocates could shift registers: Muir’s account of the
benefits of the national parks at the opening of his book-length promotion, Our National
Parks, had as much of Olmsted as, one might say, of Muir. See MUIR, supra note 45, at 1–6.
165
YARD, supra note 150, at 20–21.
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IV. ECOLOGICAL INTERDEPENDENCE
In the early 1960s, a new view of the natural world began to gain prominence, and soon defined an era of lawmaking, environmental politics, and
public debate. This was ecological interdependence, an image of nature in
which all natural systems, including the bodies of human beings and other
living things, are intensely interconnected and even inter-permeable. Like
progressive management before it, ecological interdependence helped
lawmakers, reformers, and ordinary citizens make sense of and organize a
tangle of new problems, most of them rooted in pollution and, especially,
toxic contamination. Preserving and restoring nature’s delicate balance
formed a new goal for resource managers, although the goal soon proved
elusive both conceptually and practically.
The landmark statutes of this era established a new model of environmental governance, embodied in such laws as NEPA, the Clean Air Act, and
the Clean Water Act. Major legislation from 1785, the date of the first law
for public disposal of frontier lands,166 through the 1964 Wilderness Act,167
shared an operational principle: geographic dedication, or, perhaps better,
continental zoning. They allocated tracts of land to private ownership or
public management, the latter by creating parks, national forests, and wilderness, and, finally, by closing the remainder of the public domain to privatization. Each vision of nature thus claimed its acreage, dedicated to favored
uses, and relatively little thought went into the connections among uses and
regions. By contrast, the anti-pollution statutes set out to govern, in the ungainly term of the field, “media” such as air and water that cut across and
connect all places. In the same spirit, NEPA directed the federal government
to consider the ecological effects of all its “major . . . actions,”168 from
building a road in a national park to approving a nuclear power plant. The
new model of governance sought principles (substantive in the anti-pollution
statutes, procedural in courts’ construction of NEPA) to govern systems that
crossed and confounded the borders that geographic dedication had established. This meant direct and extensive regulation of both public and private
actors with an eye to systems that respected no jurisdictional boundaries.
The perspective of ecological interdependence is the most difficult of
the four to characterize in summary fashion. This is partly because it describes an all-pervading situation, a general condition of human action, and
so, unlike the earlier viewpoints, it is hardest to confine, either spatially or
topically. It is also the most fully contemporary of the four. Although all
four perspectives continue to interact and develop, the meaning of ecological
interdependence remains markedly open-ended. This is as true of its moral
166

See generally GATES, supra note 56, at 59–74 (discussing the Land Ordinance of

1785).
167
Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§1131–1136
(2006)).
168
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
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appeal as its practical consequences. For some adherents, ecological awareness deepens and generalizes the romantic perspective: nature’s complexity
humbles human ambition, while the inherent richness of the natural world
provides a deeper meaning than material progress can.169 For others, the
ecological perspective simply provides a vast new frontier of information for
technocratic management, increasing the sophistication and flexibility required of policy design, but making no change to its basic purposes, and
adding nothing to the moral dimension of the human relation to nature. Because the diverse meanings of ecological interdependence could fill a long
article, this Part presents the viewpoint in relative schematic fashion and
concentrates on the circumstances in which it arose and the appeals that
made it attractive, particularly its promise to enrich the moral relationship to
nature and provide a source of meaning and identity in a time when many
felt disenchanted with technological mastery and material progress.
A. Ecological Interdependence: Natural and Human
The institutional developments of this period were interwoven with the
era’s defining view of the human place in nature, ecological interdependence. This was founded in an image of the physical world as composed of
complex, long-distance, and frequently invisible webs of cause and effect,
forming an interdependent whole rather than a collection of relatively freestanding parts. The most salient implication of interdependence was that
people and natural systems alike were vulnerable to the effluents of industrial technology: once released, wastes could return in unexpected and undetectable ways, through wind, rivers, food chains, and bloodstreams. Rachel
Carson’s Silent Spring is a polemical poetics of interdependent systems,
treating the passage of pesticides through air, water, and land, plants and
animals, and, finally, human bodies.170 By the end of the 1960s, it had become standard to say that industrial society endangered everyone in novel
ways, and that ecology, the science of interdependent relations, was the key
to understanding this.171
169

See infra, Part IV.B.
See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 39–83 (1962) (detailing ecological interactions
that form channels for the passage of pesticides from organism to organism); id. at 189 (connecting these same dynamics to human vulnerability and arguing that “[f]or each of us, as for
the robin in Michigan or the salmon in the Miramichi, this is a problem of ecology, of interrelationships, of interdependence”); id. at 199–216 (describing the internal activity of the human
organism as a quasi-ecological system displaying the same sorts of vulnerability as other such
systems).
171
In this period, one finds liberal-establishment voices assessing the crisis of “technological man” and forecasting a basic change in values, anchored in ecology. See The Age of
Effluence, TIME, May 10, 1968, at 52, 52 (“[T]echnological man, master of the atom and soon
the moon, is so aware of his strength that he is unaware of his weakness — the fact that his
pressure on nature may provoke revenge.”); id. at 53 (“The biggest need is for ordinary people
to learn something about ecology, a humbling as well as fascinating way of viewing reality
. . . . [Modern man] could do with some of the humility toward animals that St. Francis tried
to graft onto Christianity.”); see also Fighting to Save the Earth from Man, TIME, Feb. 2, 1970,
170
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These images contributed to the signal innovation of the period, one so
pervasive and taken-for-granted today that it is easy to miss. This is the idea
of the environment, an encompassing fact integrating many issues that might
otherwise have seemed disconnected.172 This idea made possible new kinds
of public assertions. Consider, for instance, Time magazine’s 1968 warning
of “an ecological crisis that ranges from the lowly litterbug to the lunacy of
nuclear proliferation.”173 This is familiar, perhaps banal today, but then it
was new: it would not have occurred to early conservationists or wilderness
advocates that a single concept — the environment — unified invisible
chemical pollution and the beauty of an undeveloped landscape, the
problems of the fossil-fuel economy, and the prospect of a species’
extinction.
The idea that everything in the natural world, including its human inhabitants, is connected in consequential and potentially very dangerous ways
helped to frame two newly powerful motives for environmental concern.
First was the widespread fear of an unfolding public-health disaster, in
which a “poisoned world” would sicken ecosystems and people alike.174
The second was mainstream embrace of the idea that environmental threats
were apocalyptic, threatening to produce a world “as devoid of life as are
now the mountains of the moon.”175 Both ideas, which arose and captured
public imagination over just a few years, borrowed plausibility from the perception that what harmed one part of an interdependent network of systems
would also harm the rest, gravely weakening a planet that could be portrayed, for the first time in American public life, as a sort of meta-organism.

at 56, 62 (portraying “technological man as the personification of Faust, endlessly pursuing the
unattainable”).
172
See DONALD WORSTER, NATURE’S ECONOMY, supra note 12 at 350–59 (explaining that
earlier twentieth-century uses of “environment” referred to social influences in the natureversus-nurture debate; a use referring instead to the natural setting began to arise around and
after World War Two, and the contemporary sense, linked to ecological crisis and the vulnerability of the planet, came into flower in the 1960s and 1970s).
173
The Age of Effluence, supra note 171, at 53.
174
See Fighting to Save the Earth from Man, supra note 171, at 56 (“What Americans
now breathe is closer to ambient filth than to air.”); Menace in the Skies, TIME, Jan. 27, 1967,
at 48, 52 (noting UCLA meteorologist Morris Neiburger’s warnings that “all of civilization
will pass away . . . from gradual suffocation by its own effluents”); ‘Now or Never’, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1970, at 46 (“[C]ommunities and campuses across the nation will observe
‘Earth Day’ by committing themselves to reclaim an already dangerously poisoned world.”).
175
Earth Day and Space Day, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1970, at 174; see also The Age of
Effluence, supra note 171, at 53 (“[M]any scholars of the biosphere are now seriously concerned that human pollution may trigger some ecological disaster.”); Americans Rally to Make
It Again Beautiful Land, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 23, 1970, at 3 (referring to “pollution which, according to the warnings of some scientists, threatens the very existence of life on this planet”);
Earth Week, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1970, at A20 (“American air, land, and water . . . has
become . . . the world’s most expensive monument to pollution . . . . [M]an is running out of
soons faster than he runs out of issues.”); Gladwin Hill, Activity Ranges from Oratory to
Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1970, at 1 (referring to “ecological problems, which many
scientists say urgently require action if the earth is to remain habitable”).
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B. Ecological Interdependence and the Moral Image of Nature
The new image of nature as “the environment,” then, helped to highlight and integrate — and, in cases, exaggerate — the importance of a set of
practical problems. It was also the vehicle for a new view of nature’s moral
significance. The idea was that accurately perceiving the interconnections
between organisms and their environments, and among nature’s many lifesustaining processes, was morally educative. It became almost commonplace to assert that seeing the natural world in this way created respect for it
by revealing value inherent in the integrity, resilience, and complexity of
life.176 Apprehending this value was said to impart humility, a byword of the
period, which typically meant denying that nature should be valued exclusively for human needs, in favor of a willingness to adjust goals and priorities to natural patterns and constraints.177 As a contributor to the Sierra Club
Bulletin argued in 1969, the only way to avert ecological disaster was “to
recognize that we are not masters of the living system on which we depend
for our life but parts of it, just as much as cells are part of the body.”178
This blend of prudential warnings and calls for respect and humility
toward nature kept company with another idea, that ecologically sensitive
perception brought positive human goods. In the early 1970s, environmentalists increasingly asserted that “ecology [which yesterday] was a science
. . . had better become something like a religion,”179 and called for a “cultural transformation” marked by “personal commitment to a new philosophy
and poetry of ecology.”180 This seems to have implied a form of self-knowledge and enriched personal experience that grew from awareness of being
embedded in a web of ecological relations. Paul Shepard wrote in The Subversive Science, a 1969 treatment of the political and ethical meaning of
ecology, “we must . . . affirm [nature’s] metabolism as our own — or,
rather, our own as part of it. To do so means . . . a wider perception of the
landscape as a creative, harmonious being . . . . [W]e must affirm that the
world is a being, a part of our own body.”181 In the same spirit, Buddhism
popularizer Alan Watts argued that continuity among all things, joined with
the role of perception in generating experience, meant that “[o]ur whole
knowledge of the world is, in one sense, self-knowledge,” a conclusion he
176
See The Age of Effluence, supra note 171, at 53 (“The biggest need is for ordinary
people to learn something about ecology, a humbling as well as fascinating way of viewing
reality . . . .”); Irving S. Bengelsdorf, Dear Students: Our Spaceship Earth’s in Trouble; So Are
We, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1970, at B7 (“[T]o survive on our spaceship, we must learn to do as
nature does . . . .”).
177
See, e.g., The Age of Effluence, supra note 171, at 53 (describing ecology as humbling); Bengelsdorf, supra note 176 at B7.
178
Gordon Harrison Ford, An Ecological Primer, 54 SIERRA CLUB BULL., Oct.–Nov.
1969, at 18.
179
Elizabeth Rogers, Protest!, 54 SIERRA CLUB BULL., Dec. 1969, at 11, 20.
180
Connie Flateboe, Environmental Teach-In, 55 SIERRA CLUB BULL., Mar. 1970, at 14,
15.
181
Paul Shepard, Ecology and Man—A Viewpoint, in THE SUBVERSIVE SCIENCE (1969),
reprinted in THE ECOLOGICAL CONSCIENCE at 56, 59 (Robert Disch ed., 1970).
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claimed should be deeply reassuring.182 If the world were “creative, harmonious” and continuous with the body and mind of a fully alert human being,
then one should find those same qualities in one’s self. Such instincts about
enriched personal experience seemed to lie behind pronouncements that
ecology could found a “religion” or “poetry,” a new form of identity
anchored in living within the larger living world.
These formulas were in the line of romantic epiphany, but markedly
extended its scope. The emotionally vivifying, morally clarifying connection to an immanent “divine” that John Muir and Joseph Le Conte taught
Sierra Club members to seek in spectacular places was now relocated to the
whole natural world. Nature’s contribution to human consciousness came
not through the spiritual re-broadcast towers of Half Dome and El Capitan,
but in the circuitry of everyday complexity and interdependence. The basic
sense of a world saved from drabness and moral flattening, though, was
much the same: ecological nature, like romantic nature, seemed to provide a
response to disenchantment. If there was something to T.E. Hulme’s dismissal of romanticism as “spilt religion,” the positive good that some environmentalists now found in ecology was religion soaked through and saturating
the natural world. Because this moral and aesthetic legacy rapidly became
part of environmentalism’s culture, it was possible in 1982 for a contributor
to Sierra (and chancellor of Sloan-Kettering) to invoke Le Conte’s themes
(without naming Le Conte, and probably unaware of him) more explicitly
than the original Bulletin had ever done: “[I]t is up to us . . . to become the
consciousness of the whole earth. We are the planet’s awareness of itself.”183
This moralized picture supported assertions that the widely perceived
“ecological crisis” could be traced to Americans’ failure to value nature in
the right way, and that adopting a different moral relation to the non-human
world could be the key to ecological restoration. So Time ascribed the “ecological crisis” to “[t]he false assumption that nature exists only to serve
man”184 and the Washington Post warned that “blind technology and arrogant abuse of Nature” had produced the “deep horror . . . that we live with
the [environmental] horror so calmly.”185 The Sierra Club Bulletin and
many activists claimed that the Vietnam War was a symptom of the wish for
technocratic mastery.186 Sounding a note of eco-moral restoration, Time pre182
Alan Watts, The World Is Your Body, in THE ECOLOGICAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 181,
at 181, 188.
183
Lewis Thomas, Are We Fit to Fit in? SIERRA, Mar.–Apr. 1982, at 49, 52. The Sierra
Club Bulletin was renamed Sierra in 1977 and continued publishing without interruption.
184
The Age of Effluence, supra note 171, at 53.
185
Editorial, The Environment: Clean Up or Patch Up?, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1970, at
A20.
186
For example, one article in the Sierra Club Bulletin retold the story of the Vietnam War
as one of a self-destructive American fascination with technology:

Sadly, America had one fatal flaw—its inhabitants were in love with technology and
thought it could do no wrong. A visitor to America . . . would probably have
guessed [the war’s] outcome after seeing how its inhabitants were treating their own
country. The air was mostly foul, the water putrid, and most of the land was either
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dicted that “[b]y changing national values, [environmentalism] may well
spur a profound advance in U.S. maturity and harmony with nature,”187
while the columnist Flora Lewis, a stalwart of liberal-establishment commentary, concluded that environmental ideas were “so fundamentally new,
so drastically opposed to the heritage of many centuries, they are painful to
absorb” but nonetheless utterly necessary.188
Both the practical and the moral dimensions of the new environmentalism appeared in congressional debates on the anti-pollution statutes. Some
legislators described the statutes as addressing a potentially cataclysmic public-health crisis, even the threat of human extinction.189 They described the
legislation under debate as establishing categorical principles of respect for
the natural world.190 They asserted that those principles were dictated by
recognition of ecological principles.191 It is not necessary to speculate about
the sincerity or consistency of these views to note that they had already —
which is to say, rapidly — entered the repertoire of public argument about
American environmental commitments.
To be sure, the conceit that new moral insights emancipated nature from
“serv[ing] man”192 was severely incomplete. It would be more illuminating
covered with concrete or garbage. But Americans . . . set out to save Vietnam with
the same enthusiasm and determination their forefathers had displayed in conquering
the frontier. They bombed . . . . Thousands of herbicide and defoliant missions were
flown before anyone seriously questioned their long-range effect on humans and
animals . . . By the time deformed fetuses began appearing and signs of lasting
ecological damage were becoming increasingly apparent . . . Vietnam had been
saved. But the country was dead.
A Fable for Our Times, 55 SIERRA CLUB BULL., Mar. 1970, at 16, 16–18.
187
Issue of the Year: The Environment, TIME, Jan. 21, 1971, at 21; see also, e.g., Joseph
Shapiro, Imperialism, Earth Day Address at Fordham University, New York, NY (Apr. 22,
1970) in EARTH DAY—THE BEGINNING 86, 86 (Envtl. Action ed., 1970) (“The Vietnam war
and the ecological crisis have the same roots. Both are products of a highly technological,
mechanistic, dehumanized society . . . .”).
188
Flora Lewis, Instant Mass-Movement, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1970, at B7.
189
See 118 CONG. REC. 33,693 (1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“[T]his is literally a
life or death proposition for the Nation.”); 117 CONG. REC. 38,801 (1971) (statement of Sen.
Muskie) (“Man . . . is an endangered species.”).
190
See 118 CONG. REC. 36,873 (1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“These policies [of
the bill] simply mean that streams and rivers are no longer to be considered part of the waste
treatment process.”); id. at 10,259 (statement of Rep. Vanik) (“The basic concept of the Senate
bill is that: ‘The use of any river, lake, stream, or ocean as a waste treatment system is unacceptable.’ In other words, no one has the right to pollute.”); 117 CONG. REC. 38,798 (1971)
(statement of Sen. Muskie) (“The use of any river, lake, stream, or ocean as a waste treatment
system is unacceptable.”); id. at 38,819 (statement of Sen. Cooper) (“[T]he bill declares that
no one has the right to use the Nation’s waters as a waste disposal mechanism; that there is . . .
rather an obligation to maintain the quality of those resources traditionally looked upon as free
to all, but which we now wish to protect for all.”).
191
See 117 CONG. REC. 38,800 (1971) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“The stated objective
of the act reflects the committee’s decision to recognize fundamental principles of ecology.”);
id. at 38,819 (statement of Sen. Cooper) (“[T]he bill and its purpose goes even further than
asserting that a public right resides in clean water. In a way, it recognizes an even more
fundamental condition. It asserts the primacy of the natural order, on which all, including
man, depends.”).
192
The Age of Effluence, supra note 171, at 53.
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to say that ideas of nature had once again been enlisted to help furnish a
language and imagination in which (some) Americans could navigate the
crosscurrents of their time. As commentators observed, both the acute anxiety and the spirit of moral revival that gathered around the new environmentalism took energy from the wishes of a trying time. The Vietnam War
and the threat of nuclear annihilation had convinced many Americans that
something in technocratic mastery of nature had turned destructive and selfconsuming.193 Many felt beset by political and cultural divisions around the
war, civil rights struggles, riots, and a youth culture of stylized dissent, and
environmental restoration was openly embraced as a unifying principle in an
otherwise fractured country.194 This appeal to an idea of nature to resolve a
difficulty in broader themes of politics, values, and identity was not new. As
we have seen, the Sierra Club’s appreciation of spectacular and “divine”
features of nature helped salve a crisis of faith that affected some in the later
nineteenth century, while the conservation agenda helped its adherents to
define themselves against selfishness and lassitude and create a version of
national greatness in which their sensibilities and expertise played a central
role.195 Such multiple motives are typical of the ways that new environmental values have entered American public language.
These new ideas, though, were hardly spun from whole cloth for the
cultural and psychic demands of the moment. The moral themes of ecological interdependence were also continuous in ways with earlier accounts of
humanity and nature. Progressive conservationists saw the laissez-faire eco193
See RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES:
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 217–26 (2006) (connecting rise of environmentalism with discrediting of expert management, opposition to Vietnam War, and perception
of both big business and big government as destructive); A Fable for Our Times, supra note
186, at 16–18; Issue of the Year, supra note 187, at 21 (tracing the sudden interest in the
environment to two sources, “[o]n the one hand . . . the response to a problem which American skills, including technology, might actually solve, unlike the immensely more elusive
problems of race prejudice or the war in Viet Nam” and “[o]n the other hand . . . a creeping
disillusionment with technology, an attempt by individuals to reassert control over machine
civilization”).
194
Issue of the Year, supra note 187, at 21. Two scholars characterized environmental
politics, from a radical perspective, as distinctively open to co-optation as an object of mainstream consensus:

[A] new consensus . . . consistent with the logic of technological society . . . around
which the hippies and the Hickels [Nixon’s Secretary of the Interior] might unite . . .
in common cause with the power elite . . . . It is the kind of issue which is particularly appealing when the disappointments and abrasions of political encounters become too much, for it permits a full catharsis of moral indignation without seriously
altering the structure of power or the logic of the system.
John H. Schaar & Sheldon S. Wolin, Where We Are Now, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, May 7, 1970.
195
See HOFSTADTER, supra note 131–72 (arguing that status politics played a critical role
in motivating and shaping the progressive agenda); Joseph Le Conte, Brief Address to the
Sierra Club (Nov. 23, 1895) in 1 SIERRA CLUB BULL., 1896, at 270 (noting that “[i]f we
compare the cultured man with the uncultured man . . . the most striking difference” is that
“the uncultured man is trying to live for the interests of the ‘now,’ but the cultured man — and
in proportion as he is cultured — looks to the future as well as to the present” and supports
federal reservation and management of forests).
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nomic and natural-resource policies of the nineteenth century much as the
new environmentalists saw technological mastery: as a form of self-immolating hubris. In the conservation era, though, the prescription was to perfect
technological mastery by replacing a (partly imagined) legacy of laissezfaire with public-spirited expert management, creating conditions in which
wealth and liberty would remain viable. The doubts of 1960s environmentalism were more basic. Skeptics questioned not just an approach to
public policy, but an entire ethos, asking whether pursuing wealth and liberty through technological mastery might be, in principle, unsustainable.
The new environmentalism thus promised, or threatened, a basic challenge
to a civilization’s material aspiration, as progressive management never had.
The positive side of the new ecological language also departed from
older forms. For the Muir-inspired Romantics of the Sierra Club and later
wilderness advocates, the key to nature’s instructiveness was the extremity
of the highest and most dramatic terrain and the solitude of trackless wilderness. That extremity elicited the highest qualities of its devotees: originality,
individuality, vitality, and a sense of being washed clean of the habits of
everyday life. Now, at least notionally, it was precisely everyday life that
had to be understood and reformed in light of ecological insight. Whatever
it meant for one’s awareness to be enriched by knowledge of interdependent
natural processes, it did not seem to sanction periodic shuttling between the
High Sierras of insight and an everyday life basically untouched by that
elevated experience. Nature was no longer a treasure house for a smarter
kind of resource user, nor was it simple balm for the Romantic tourist. Progressive management and romantic epiphany each prescribed an ideal interaction between human beings and the natural world. Ecological
interdependence described not a kind of action, but a condition, a predicament that promised to inform and constrain how people would act and how
they would understand themselves.
The era of ecological interdependence remains very much with us. The
gains in scientific insight that underlie it are almost certainly irreversible.
Emerging issues, from climate change to political interest in food systems,
would be impossible to describe without a full appreciation of the long-distance and complex interaction of interdependent systems. Moreover, as the
next Part shows, many of today’s legal and political conflicts are best described as lying on the fault line between ecological interdependence and
other perspectives that it threatens to displace, especially providential republicanism. Developments in environmental law and politics today are almost
inevitably also developments in the meaning of ecological interdependence.
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MAP

A. Interpretive Review of the Argument
Each approach to nature describes an ideal relationship between people
and the natural world, which fits into a larger ideal human activity. This
works in several ways. For one, each approach to nature helps to power an
image of personal dignity: the free self-governance and producerist competence of the settler in providential republicanism; the rationality, humanitarianism, and mastery over complex systems of the progressive manager; the
spontaneity, capacity for aesthetic delight, and potential self-knowledge of
the seeker after romantic epiphany; and the intense awareness of interwoven
living systems that marks the condition of ecological interdependence,
which many have claimed induces the wish to act in a way that maintains the
health of all. Second, each approach sets its representative person in an ideal
relation to social life: the egalitarianism of settlement on an open continent;
the elite public service of the progressive manager, which at once makes him
the instrument of the authoritative public interest or democratic will and
designates him its authoritative interpreter and executive; the Romantic’s
freedom to depart for a time into the wild, a concept that has always described both a region of the continent and one of the mind, without which
“this country would become a cage”196; and, perhaps more vaguely, the ideal
of healthful belonging that accompanies ecological interdependence — and
has as its shadow the threat of invisible streams of poison or of systems
driven past cataclysmic tipping points. In each case, the image of personal
dignity and that of social relations are parts of a single picture.
Each approach has also been associated with a style of environmental
governance that promises to uphold an ideal human-nature relationship. The
major United States land policy of the nineteenth century, to create private
property and spur development of the continent, was providential republicanism in action. Progressive management brought the second paradigm regime, in which large tracts of land remained in federal ownership to be
managed for dedicated uses — sustainable production, recreation, aesthetics
— while the two-thirds of the continent already in private hands continued
under mainly common-law regulation.197 In a geographic division of labor
and jurisdiction, the latter lands were mainly untouched by the ambitions of
progressive management.
As for romantic epiphany, it is best understood as having introduced
new goals for expert public lands managers to pursue, but not a new style of
governance. The institutional innovation in the politics of romantic epiphany took the form of social movements that could help to carry personal and
aesthetic experience into public language. By contrast, the language of eco196

107 CONG. REC. 18,365 (1961) (statement of Sen. Church).
See GATES, supra note 56, at ii (noting that “about one-third of the Nation’s total land
area” is in federal ownership).
197
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logical interdependence did accompany a new model of governance, the farreaching regulation of the anti-pollution statutes and the Endangered Species
Act, which aimed to maintain the health of systems with no neat spatial
bounds. Instead of allocating acreage among competing uses and governance regimes, this new generation of statutes sought to change the environmental consequences of production and consumption at large, from power
plants to tailpipes.
Each approach to the natural world, then, persists in a set of laws and
on specific acreage dedicated to favored purposes such as private use, public
commodities production, and publicly accessible recreation or aesthetics.
Each approach also persists in today’s environmental politics. In some instances, the means of this political persistence is easy to trace: groups such
as the Sierra Club have cultivated intergenerational constituencies around
their ideals of human-nature interaction, even as they increasingly integrated
the Romantic themes of their founders with the imagery of ecological interdependence. In other cases, the passage of attitudes through time requires
more detailed attention than I have yet been able to give it. The language of
providential republicanism — linking liberty and dignity to productive resource use, and linking the abuse of power to the regulation or prohibition of
such use — has recurred in the justification of continental settlement, nineteenth-century political resistance to timber management on public lands,
and the Sagebrush Rebellion and Counties Movements that attacked federal
lands policy and denied federal supremacy in the 1980s and 1990s.198 At this
stage, this Article does not attempt to connect these various uses of providential-republican language, but only observes that the same versions of personal dignity, political liberty, anti-managerial sentiment, and the purpose of
the natural world have often formed a single constellation.
B. Three Levels of the Map
This Article’s account of four understandings of nature provides a way
of organizing and expanding what we know about environmental law. The
four conceptions of nature provide the key to new maps of this area of law.
These maps can work at four levels (if not more). First, they can sort the
statutes and doctrines that make up environmental law according to the conception of nature that each is premised upon. In important respects, our laws
are providential, progressive, romantic, or ecological, and where they blend,
the same distinctions serve to identify and disentangle their elements. Second, courts’ treatment of overlapping and divergent statutes provides a
deeper map, one of conflict and synthesis among statutes embodying the
198

See R. MCGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND, WESTERN ANGER: THE SAGEBRUSH REENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 71–91 (1993) (outlining sources and formulations of
Western objections to federal policy around the Sagebrush Rebellion); Tom Kenworthy, Blazing Utah Trails to Block a Washington Monument, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1996, at A1 (describing Western members of County Movement engaged in efforts to assert local control over
federal land).
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premises of the different eras of environmental lawmaking. Third, the four
conceptions of nature suggest a way of enriching knowledge of the political
conflict around environmental lawmaking. Specifically, they suggest an important complement to certain social-psychological methods that are prominent in accounts of environmental politics, notably cultural cognition theory
and behavioral theories of cognitive bias. Fourth, this Article’s approach
points toward a way of mapping the landscape itself, showing concretely
how the premises and priorities of an area of law find expression in the
shape of the physical terrain that the law governs.
1. A Map of Conflicts and Synthesis
Environmental and natural-resource scholars have long lacked a general
picture of the range of values and interests that the laws they study serve.
Efforts to borrow from environmental ethics are not always helpful, because
philosophers’ distinctions concerning the nature and sources of value do not
track the conflicting ideas that have informed American environmental lawmaking.199 A complementary approach would recognize that four partly
overlapping generations of lawmaking have infused the law with the respective premises of four versions of environmental imagination. These laws
coexist and interact today, and the competing values they embody help to
structure legal conflict over the governance of nature.
The legacy of providential republicanism is, above all, the private land
ownership that dominates the United States east of the Rocky Mountains.200
Disbursed under policies aimed at settling the continent as an agrarian republic, this acreage lies under the strong premise of owners’ authority to
develop or otherwise extract value from it. Other than reciprocal limits on
owners’ rights, such as the nuisance doctrine, most legal regulation of the
uses of this land is relatively new, a product of environmental laws passed in
the 1970s or thereafter.201 These strong private rights, deeply associated with
images of self-reliance and autonomy, are the legal basis, and the moral and
political subtext, of several lines of resistance to federal environmental regulation, particularly the post-1990 expansion of Takings Clause jurisprudence202 and restriction of the Commerce Power.203 In these cases, courts
199
See, e.g., JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW & POLICY 19–36 (2d ed.
2009) (setting out theoretical approaches to environmental and natural resource values).
200
From the beginning of the Rockies westward, the share of federal land is vastly greater.
See id. at 141 (showing share of acreage in public hands state by state, with rates almost
uniformly below ten percent from the Rocky Mountain eastward, and ranging from thirty to
eighty percent from Colorado westward).
201
The exception, of course, is zoning, pervasive since the early twentieth century in relatively developed areas. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(establishing constitutionality of most ordinary zoning practice).
202
Compare Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (referring to
“erection of . . . habitable or productive improvements on . . . land” as “the ‘essential use’ of
land” and thus presumptively privileged under the common-law baseline established in this
case as the reference point for takings claims under the U.S. Constitution), with id. at 1069–70
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (insisting on the importance in the history of property law of changes
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have asked what accommodation the law will reach between providentialrepublican rights of use, enshrined in ownership, and the potentially all-embracing constraints of laws from the era of ecological interdependence.
Providential republicanism aimed to produce not just an agrarian republic, but an extractive one. Thus it also left a network of private legal claims
on lands later (or previously) reserved for the public, notably hundreds of
thousands of mining claims established under the General Mining Law of
1872,204 and rights of road access that arose before 1976 under a provision of
the 1866 Mining Law known as R.S. 2477.205 Both kinds of claims are
threaded across the public lands.206 In some cases, mining dramatically disrupts recreational or conservation use, as with a spate of new uranium claims
on land controlled by the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) near the
Grand Canyon during the second George W. Bush administration.207 In
other cases, road access thwarts designation of public lands as wilderness,
and for this reason asserting and denying R.S. 2477 claims becomes a key
tactic in determining whether a tract of land is dedicated to populist use,
such as off-road vehicle recreation, or the romantic ideal of remote soliin rights driven by “constant learning and evolution — both moral and practical,” and that in
environmental regulation “[n]ew appreciation of the significance of endangered species, the
importance of wetlands, and the vulnerability of coastal lands shapes our evolving understandings of property rights” (internal citations omitted)).
203
Cf. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159,
174 (finding Army Corps of Engineers exceeded authority granted by Congress in Clean Water
Act in interpreting the Act as extending to isolated bodies of water used by migratory birds);
id. at 174–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (invoking burning of Cuyahoga River as backdrop to
Clean Water Act and claiming majority’s opinion “needlessly weakens our principal safeguard
against toxic water”). Compare Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (ascribing to the Army Corps of Engineers the “discretion of an enlightened despot” in ruling on “a
broad range of ordinary industrial and commercial [land-use] activity”), with id. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the plurality’s reasoning and arguing that the
term “navigable” in the Clean Water Act should be read as referring to waters sharing an
“ecologic interconnection” with classically navigable water).
204
See 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2006) (“[A]ll valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the
United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, shall be free and open to exploration and
purchase, and the lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the
United States . . . .”).
205
R.S. 2477, which was recodified as 43 U.S.C. § 932 and repealed in 1976 with the
passage of the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act, provided: “That the right of way for
the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby
granted.” 14 Stat. 253 (1866); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a), 1701(h), 1769(a) (2006) (protecting
valid existing rights of access).
206
The Bureau of Land Management reports about 1.1 million active mining claims on the
federal lands, ranging from 20 to 160 acres in size, with significant environmental effects. See
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF
THE WEST 33 (1992). In 2003, a pair of scholars reported that the State of Utah and its counties had claimed between 10,000 and 20,000 roads across federal land, and that Alaska and
some California counties had begun making similar claims. See Stephen H.M. Bloch & Heidi
J. McIntosh, A View from the Front Lines: The Fate of Utah’s Redrock Wilderness Under the
George W. Bush Administration, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 473, 489–90 (2003).
207
See John M. Broder, Uranium Mine Moratorium Extended at Grand Canyon, N.Y.
TIMES, Jun. 20, 2011 at A16 (noting that the Obama administration would continue an administrative moratorium after a Bush administration policy permitted thousands of new mining
claims near the Grand Canyon in 2006 and 2007).
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tude.208 In deciding whether R.S. 2477 claims are present on public lands,
courts have inevitably had to choose between the procedures of the different
eras: Does primary jurisdiction to determine the status of such a claim fall to
courts using the common-law standard for acquisition of an easement, the
way such rights were defined when the main purpose of public land was
economic development, or does it fall to the BLM, administering its progressive-managerial judgment among conflicting land-use priorities?209 When
the Tenth Circuit ruled in 2005 that the governing criterion should be that of
the common law, it chose among eras, handing a victory to the premises of
providential republicanism.210
The governance strategy that arose from progressive management is the
dominant legal framework for nearly a third of the nation’s land, the federal
acreage permanently reserved and managed as national parks, forests, wilderness, wildlife refuges, national monuments, and so forth. From the Forest
Service Organic Act of 1897 to the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976,211 the basic premise has held: these lands are to be managed by
independent (though ultimately politically accountable) experts, according to
a rational planning system designed to serve a conception of the public interest that the governing statute sets out in broad and pluralist terms.212 Within
their broad zone of expert discretion, resource managers are perennially
hemmed in by rights and duties arising from the other three sources of environmental lawmaking. As discussed in the previous paragraph, private
rights of use and access arising under providential-republican statutes harry
and sometimes confound coherent policy-making under the progressivemanagement statutes.
208

For a sample of the tone of exchange, see Phantom Roads, S. UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIhttp://www.suwa.org/issues/phantom-roads-r-s-2477 (last visited January 3, 2012) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library) (describing R.S. 2477 as “highway robbery,” a
scheme based on “bogus roads,” and a “nightmare” for administrative agencies).
209
See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735, 750–57 (10th Cir. 2005) (concluding that district court abused its discretion in concluding that primary jurisdiction over
question of the validity of an R.S. 2477 claim lay with the BLM); id. at 762–67 (holding that
the proper criteria for determining validity of an R.S. 2477 claim are those articulated in state
law of rights-of-way).
210
Id. at 768–84 (articulating the substance of state common-law bases for R.S. 2477
rights, the products of a pro-development era in federal public lands law).
211
Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. 1701–1782
(2006)).
212
See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2006) (directing the BLM to manage public lands for “multiple use and sustained yield”); 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2006) (defining “multiple use” to include
“a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses that takes into account the long-term
needs of future generations for renewable and non-renewable resources, including, but not
limited to, recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic,
scientific and historical values”); 43 U.S.C. § 1702(h) (defining “sustained yield” as
“achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output
of the various renewable resources of the public lands consistent with multiple use”); 16
U.S.C. § 1604 (2006) (directing the Forest Service, inter alia, to “use a systematic interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical, biological, economic, and
other sciences” to assign forest areas for timber harvests “in a manner consistent with the
protection of soil, watershed, fish, wildlife, recreation, and esthetic resources, and the regeneration of the timber resource”).
ANCE,
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The romantic conception of nature has its dedicated terrain, as mentioned earlier in this Article, in more than 100 million acres of statutory
wilderness. Unlike other land under federal management, wilderness is governed by categorical statutory prohibitions: no roads, no permanent structures, no travel by motorized vehicles, and no commercial activity other than
limited expedition services.213 We may expect to see these restrictions come
into question in the next few decades as climate change induces ecological
shifts that undermine the implied baseline of a “natural” state that the Wilderness Act preserves. Managers and courts will have to decide whether to
pursue more active forms of management to preserve species and habitat that
might otherwise yield to climate-induced stress, or to take literally the Act’s
prohibitions and impose passive management as the “natural” area changes
under the managers’ gaze.214 At a conceptual level, these challenges reflect
the fact that the dynamics central to the ecological-interdependence view of
nature have eroded the premise of the romantic view — that there exists a
subsistent, pristine nature that humans can preserve — and confronted the
law with the problem of what kind of nature to preserve, or to create.
The statutes from the era of ecological interdependence, beginning with
NEPA, implement a new model of governance. Above all, the ambition to
govern such ubiquitous, jurisdiction-spanning phenomena as air, water, and
biodiversity confounds all previous rights to determine the use of a local
resource, whether the right belongs to a private landowner or a federal management agency. In federal resource management, for instance, NEPA’s application to federal grazing management between 1974 and 1976 disrupted
decades of management catering to grazers and helped to spur Western resistance that became the Sagebrush Rebellion, ancestor of the Western Tea Parties.215 The Endangered Species Act, which requires that federal actions
neither jeopardize threatened or endangered species nor compromise their
designated “critical habitat,”216 has significantly limited traditional discretion in resource management.217
These conflicts are perhaps most interesting when they involve higherorder law, such as constitutional doctrine, in the task of mediating between
the imperatives of two eras of lawmaking. Consider standing. Recent stand213
See 16 U.S.C. § 1133 (2006); Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d
1051, 1062–67 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding an agency-authorized salmon-stocking program in a wilderness area illegal as a violation of the Wilderness Act’s prohibition of “commercial activity”).
214
For a discussion of very similar challenges that climate change poses to management of
endangered species, see J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building
Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2008).
215
See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 388 F.Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), aff’d per
curiam, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976); WILKINSON, supra note
206, at 98–100 (attributing the rise of the anti-regulatory and anti-federal Sagebrush Rebellion
to increased federal oversight arising from Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton).
216
See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2006).
217
See, e.g., Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d
515 (9th Cir. 1998) (addressing a series of Endangered Species Act impediments to Bureau of
Reclamation water-management decisions).
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ing decisions crystallize a conflict between at least two conceptions of nature, made operational in law, and each conflict has produced an attempt at
synthesis or balance. These superficially disparate examples, that is, express
a more general logic: a challenge arises from the coexistence of competing,
legally operational conceptions of nature and invites persistent judicial attempts at resolution.
The issue in standing cases is whether the Article III terms “Cases” and
“Controversies” give federal courts jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs
with remote connections to the problems whose governance they seek to
affect.218 The Supreme Court has held that, to bring an Article III claim, a
plaintiff must have a legal injury that is concrete and particularized, actual or
imminent, fairly traceable to the act she complains of, and likely to be redressed by the relief she seeks.219 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (involving a claim under the Endangered Species Act), plaintiffs claimed standing
on the basis of previous visits to regions inhabited by the species they
claimed would be affected by the actions they sought to challenge, but plaintiffs lacked specific plans to return to those areas.220 In denying standing, the
Court belittled arguments that standing should be available through an
“ecosystem nexus,” for any user of an ecosystem that provides habitat for a
species listed as endangered or threatened, or an “animal nexus” or “vocational nexus” for anyone who works with or otherwise demonstrates interest
in an endangered species, anywhere in the world.221 In Massachusetts v.
EPA222 (involving the Clean Air Act), the Court found standing for the state
of Massachusetts, but did not decide the status of standing for non-sovereign
plaintiffs had Massachusetts not been in the case.223 Addressing whether an
injury linked to climate change, a phenomenon thoroughly dispersed through
the global atmosphere, could provide the basis for standing, the Court ruled
that Massachusetts could rely on its position as a sovereign coastal landowner to satisfy the Article III requirements.224 Specifically, loss of coastal
land from a rising sea was sufficiently concrete and traceable to climate
change, and the relief sought (directing the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions in new vehicle fleets) would contribute sufficiently to the prospect
of redress.225 In a vehement dissent, Chief Justice Roberts and three others
argued that climate change is so diffuse, remote, complex, and uncertain a
phenomenon that it defies specific proof that any plaintiff’s injury is fairly
traceable to a specific violation of law and likely to be redressed by a remedy the court can provide — the constitutional core of a justiciable claim.226

218

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
220
See id. at 562–64.
221
See id. at 565–67.
222
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
223
See id. at 526.
224
See id.
225
See id. at 516–26.
226
See id. at 535–49 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
219
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The point to appreciate here is that these cases adjudicate between competing paradigms of the human relation to nature. These controversial standing claims rested on underlying causes of action that were paradigmatic of
the problems their respective statutes sought to address, and for the era of
ecological interdependence that produced them. The Endangered Species
Act established a legally protected interest in “any person” to seek assurance of survival for a species the plaintiff might never see.227 The Clean Air
Act established a legally protected interest in the operation of regulatory
apparatus that would reduce risk of harm from remote, complex, and obscure
atmospheric interactions among pollutants.228 The conceptions of injury,
causation, and redressability that justified denial of standing, by contrast,
rested on interests in nature paradigmatic of earlier episodes of lawmaking:
those of owners and public-lands resource users. Justice Scalia has argued
for putting at the center of standing doctrine the private owner with an economic interest that motivates an anti-regulatory legal claim.229 Individual
users of dedicated public lands have undoubted standing to challenge landuse decisions,230 but the presence of such individuals, with concrete aesthetic
and recreational interests of the kind the Sierra Club helped bring to the
center of public-land policy, also remains necessary for standing.231 The
claimants that standing doctrine favors are the model citizens of providential
republicanism and progressive management, respectively: the owners of nature and the recreational users of publicly managed nature. The citizen who
remains shut out of court by standing doctrine (unless represented by her
state government, as in Massachusetts) is the model subject of ecological
interdependence, whose physical interdependence with, or moral and aesthetic valuation of, a faraway part of nature runs beyond simple forms of
causation. The heart of ecological interdependence, and the premise of the
laws it shaped, was that such interests are not less real for being more complex and remote. The implicit view of standing doctrine so far is that the
constitutional concept of justiciability does, in fact, regard them as less real,
and remains attached exclusively to the paradigmatic interests of older conceptions of nature.
One might look at this example in at least two ways. It might seem, on
the one hand, to be an exercise in intergenerational synthesis. Courts often
labor to integrate the premises of different jurisprudential eras or episodes of
227
See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006) (authorizing “any person” to bring suit to enforce the
requirements of the Endangered Species Act).
228
See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006) (authorizing “any person” to bring suit to enforce the
requirements of the Clean Air Act).
229
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (distinguishing between the unproblematic case in which plaintiff is “himself” the object of regulation and the
much more vexed case where plaintiff complains of government’s failure to regulate a third
party); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983) (arguing that the central judicial responsibility is
to protect the rights of individuals against government, with assertion of property rights against
regulation being paradigmatic).
230
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
231
See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–500 (2009).
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lawmaking.232 The disputes in these standing cases arise from the sharpness
of the departure that the era of ecological interdependence marked from earlier periods of environmental language and imagination. It should not be a
surprise, then, that when justices weighed the new statutes alongside traditional suppositions about what constituted a justiciable claim, some found it
necessary to trim the courts’ role in citizen suits for environmental enforcement, to bring it closer to a traditional function infused with pre-ecological
ideas of injury, causation, and redressability.233 By contrast, one might instead take these cases as a more straightforward political defeat for the
premises of ecological independence. On this view, the restrictive standing
doctrine articulated in Lujan and subsequent cases is not necessary to preserve any essential feature of the judicial role as traditionally understood.
Rather, the judicial role is quite compatible with the premises of ecological
interdependence — or would be, if not for its politically motivated circumscription to impose pre-ecological constraints ex post on the enforcement of
ecologically oriented statutes.234
Whatever view one takes of the standing cases, they highlight the
layered character of the environmental imagination and its practical expressions in law. All four ways of approaching the natural world remain active,
in statutes and doctrines and in the political constituencies that put legislators in office and, ultimately, judges on the bench.
2. A Map of Politics
There is an obvious sense in which important interest and advocacy
groups in environmental lawmaking and litigation map onto the typology
developed here. The Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, Defenders of
Wildlife, the Center for Biological Diversity, and other established environmentalist groups carry forward some combination of the romantic and ecological conceptions of nature’s value. (Many are, after all, institutionally
descended from those who helped create and spread those conceptions.)
Providential ideas continue in traditional resource users’ resistance to regulation, whether among mining, timber, grazing, or other interests, and coalesce
into general movements of resistance such as the Sagebrush Rebellion and,
in some aspects, the Tea Party. Progressive attitudes to nature persist in the
232
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 140–62 (1991) (describing
Supreme Court’s activity of intergenerational synthesis, in which substantive principles and
ideas of judicial role from multiple eras are adjusted and partly reconciled).
233
Although he does not say it in as many words, this seems a reasonable characterization
of the approach to the issue that Justice Scalia takes in The Doctrine of Standing, where he
argues for a view of standing that restricts judicial involvement in environmental enforcement
suits according to criteria that maintain traditional separation-of-powers principles as he understands them. Scalia, supra note 229, at 881–82.
234
I take it this is the view of Cass R. Sunstein. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Standing
and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein,
What’s Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV.
163 (1992).
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federal agencies themselves, policy-oriented groups such as the Environmental Defense Fund, and, not least, among law professors. Our profession’s habit of writing for an idealized enlightened policy-maker, or
providing rational-actor explanations of why no such policy-maker has yet
appeared, flies the flag of progressive management in a time when its expansionist hopes are somewhat diminished.
There is, though, a subtler and more interesting way that the competing
conceptions of nature explored in this Article may shape environmental
politics, even among those not engaged in explicit ideological argument.
Recent work in social psychology has highlighted that perceptions of the
reality and severity of environmental problems, along with perceptions of
other policy-relevant factual matters, are strongly affected by a range of cognitive factors. In a provocative body of work, Dan Kahan and various collaborators have shown that broadly defined cultural worldviews correspond
to perceptions of policy-relevant facts.235 These worldviews deeply affect
individual assessments of empirical questions, such as whether climate
change is real and, if so, whether it is caused by human activity.236
People who dislike regulation, mistrust “big government,” and get their
sense of worth from traditional hierarchies tend to doubt climate change is
real — though they sometimes feel differently when they are told that it
could be fought with heroic technologies like nuclear power and geo-engineering.237 Those who believe in regulation, mistrust markets and individualism, and would like to make social life more egalitarian tend to believe
climate change is real and human-caused — though they are more likely to
doubt it if they think it requires heroic technologies rather than virtuous
emissions control.238 Libertarians and cultural conservatives are more likely
to find evidence of climate change persuasive when it is presented as implying market-based responses, less so when it comes with a call for regulation.239 The reverse holds for government-friendly egalitarians.240
It is fair to say that none of this reflects the merits of the science. Some
of it has to do with what kinds of governance respondents feel comfortable
or uncomfortable with: they resist believing in problems that seem to require
regulation or other interventions (such as geo-engineering) that they dislike.
These, in turn, seem connected with status: a certain version of the problem
and its solutions makes me right, and people like you, wrong.
235

See Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 1–6.
See id. at 4; see also ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE
CHANGE COMMC’N, GLOBAL WARMING: DEMOCRATS, REPUBLICANS, INDEPENDENTS, AND THE
TEA PARTY 7 (2011), available at www.environment.yale.edu/climate/files/PoliticsGlobalWarming2011.pdf (finding that Democrats are most likely, Tea Party members least
likely, to believe climate change is real, human-caused, and requires response and also finding
that Tea Party members tend to be hierarchical individualists within the cultural-cognition
scheme).
237
See Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 4–5.
238
See id. at 5–6.
239
See id.
240
See id.
236
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The working hypothesis of the cultural cognition school has been that
views about the empirical foundations of environmental issues are epiphenomena of the same general search for identity-reinforcement as views about
other issues, such as the safety of abortions or the effect that widespread gun
ownership has on crime.241 The unifying variable is whether one feels affronted or affirmed by the kinds of policies the facts imply, and the type of
social order such policies would tend to produce.
This Article’s account of the American environmental imagination, with
its connections to both lawmaking and the dignity-conferring aspects of personal identity, suggests an alternative hypothesis. What if, like views about
one’s place in the social order, views about one’s place in the order of nature
also work as independent variables in judgments of fact? What if people
cleave to views of the natural world that reinforce their sense that their own
relation to nature is righteous, without necessary mediation through types of
government policy that they like or dislike? One gets a hint that this might
be so in Tea Party activists’ religious explanations of their climate-change
skepticism: if the continent’s resources were placed here for our use, how
could it be that, by using them, we could undermine our form of life?242 A
natural order that works so as to turn human consumption of fossil fuels and
other resources into tragedy rather than comedy refutes the providential-republican commitment to the fruitful use of all that nature gives. It suggests
that extractive labor and prosperity based on it are not heroic and dignified
but clownish and villainous. Archetypically, every honest man in a truck
becomes a goon in a Hummer. Perhaps the problem with climate change is
not that higher gas taxes or fuel-efficiency standards would undermine a
hierarchical and individualist view of the world, but that nature itself would
seem to abandon its support for that view.
Every era of environmental lawmaking has portrayed an exemplary
human relation to nature at the heart of its story: the sturdy settler or landowner, the rational and public-spirited manager, the romantic seeking solitude and insight, and the aware and integrated (but endangered) subject of
ecological interdependence. These self-images, and the experiences that
came with them, were essential to many who helped establish these forms of
imagination and drive forward the eras of lawmaking that put them into effect. The forms of language they established now have wide currency. It is
well worth trying to establish whether judgments about environmental issues

241
See Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun
Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L.J.
569 (2006); Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, Cultural Evaluations of Risk: “Values” or “Blunders”? 119 HARV. L. REV. 166 (2006) (stating and applying the cultural cognition methodology); Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741
(2008) (same); Dan M. Kahan et al., Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn’t, And Why? An
Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501
(2010) (same).
242
See Broder, supra note 4.
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today refer directly to these worldviews, to specifically environmental
imagination.
3. A Map of the Land
Environmental lawmaking literally shapes the land in keeping with an
idea. For one example, the wilderness idea, enshrined in more than 100
million acres of statutorily protected land, is an invention of romantic
thought: a land without human inhabitants or the marks of human passage
(other than a few foot trails). When created, this idea was something new in
the world. Now it describes the terrain it governs and has created, land open
to people seeking kinds of rugged adventure and quasi-religious solitude that
were also invented, or at least re-inflected, by the same romantic developments that created the wilderness idea itself. The national parks, too, are a
thoroughly artificial kind of natural terrain, administered to make as real as
possible Olmsted’s paradoxical thought that any American should be able to
find glorious and restorative vistas within reach of home and work. Theirs is
a landscape architecture of accessible wildness, short-order solitude.
The national forests and BLM lands are less unified in their statutory
aims because they are dedicated to the idea of multiple use: one big idea that
contains several conflicting ideas. They are landscape-scale essays in balancing very different kinds of public and private benefits, from grazing and
timbering to off-road vehicle use and wilderness management. The massive
documents that govern these lands are literally zoning plans, designations of
smaller and larger parcels committed to one or another statutorily permitted
use, or some hierarchical combination of several.243 All these lands, each
intensively managed in its own way, are a physical expression of the way a
statute embodies an idea about how Americans should use the natural world.
What is less obvious, and maybe more valuable to see for just that reason, is that private lands are also shaped by the way the law expresses underlying ideas about humanity and nature. The shaping of private land is less
direct and comprehensive than the shaping of public land, but it is pervasive.
The farmland of the Midwest, for example, takes the physical shape of the
rectangular land grants distributed by the General Land Office, the flagship
bureaucratic avatar of providential republicanism.244 What grows on those
squares, in turn, has much to do with an extensive subsidy system that, as
Henry David Thoreau might have written, makes the land say corn and soybeans.245 An appropriately fine-tuned satellite map would show the property
lines and flora of the region as, importantly, a product of the law that made it
and continues to make it. (Most readers will recognize that taking a window
243
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CORONADO NATIONAL FOREST PLAN (2005), available
at http://www.fs.fed.us/r3/coronado/plan-revision/plan-revision-documents.shtml.
244
See GATES, supra note 56, at 65 (summarizing this mode of designating lands to be
distributed by the federal government).
245
Cf. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN in WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS 105, 220–21
(Joseph Wood Krutch ed., 1981) (describing his work in a bean field as “making the earth say
beans instead of grass”).
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seat on a flight over the same region gets across much of the same
information.)
The most illuminating product of this landscape mapping is a category
of landscape entailed by our legal design, and the commitments behind it,
but not usually named or recognized as such. This is the sacrifice zone,246
the repository of negative externalities, the harms the law assigns to no one
with the power to do anything about them. The Appalachian hills that
mountaintop-removal strip-mining turns into tree-poor and nearly level
plateaus, burying hundreds of miles of streams in the process, are one example: governing interpretations of the Clean Water Act and Surface Mining
and Reclamation Act impose only modest limits on the practice, meaning the
irreversible transformation of the landscape is a mostly invisible side-effect
of a commitment to inexpensive energy and easy extraction of coal.247 The
hypoxic “dead zone” in the Gulf of Mexico, a product of fertilizer runoff
from the farmland along the tributaries of the Mississippi (that is, most of
the country’s farmland outside California), is another sacrifice zone, much
less famous than the 2010 Gulf oil spill, but almost certainly more harmful.248 (It is, moreover, only the best known of many such hypoxic zones in
coastal waters around the world.)249 Laws that promote cheap and plentiful
food, in an ideological marriage of providential republicanism and progressive management, with a cynical overlay of modern public-choice theory, do
not only produce the corn-and-soybean terrain of the Midwest.250 They also
produce the aquatic sacrifice zone that it feeds.
246
This term has a fair amount of traction in environmental conservation. See, e.g., Dave
Foreman, Wilderness Areas for Real, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note 20,
at 395, 397 (criticizing the dichotomous view in which natural places must be either preserved
as wilderness or designated “sacrifice zones where industrialism can run rampant”).
247
See generally JEDEDIAH PURDY, FOR COMMON THINGS 129–60 (1999) (describing the
practice of mountaintop removal strip-mining). The most important decisions on the environmental laws governing the practice are Ohio Valley Envtl. Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556
F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009) (rejecting challenge to hydrological and biological methodology of
Army Corps of Engineers’ analysis of impacts of permitted surface mines); Ohio Valley Envtl.
Coalition v. Bulen, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005) (rejecting challenge to analysis supporting
Army Corps of Engineers’ nationwide permit for valley fills, where mining debris is deposited); Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003)
(rejecting a challenge to Army Corps of Engineers’ issuance of valley-fill permits under section 404 of Clean Water Act); Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 297–98 (4th Cir.
2001) (holding citizen-suit provision of Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act
inapplicable to state surface-mining program on federalism grounds).
248
See 2011 Gulf of Mexico ‘Dead Zone’ Could Be Biggest Ever, SCIENCE DAILY, Jul. 18,
2011, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/07/110718141618.htm (reporting an average
size of 5800 square miles, approaching 9400 square miles in severe years).
249
See Roger Highfield, Ocean Dead Zones Free of Oxygen Double Every Decade, THE
TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 14, 2008 (noting that scientists are presently aware of 405 hypoxic
dead zones totaling 95,000 square miles and estimate that the actual total may be much
greater).
250
See JASON CLAY, WORLD AGRICULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A COMMODITY-BYCOMMODITY GUIDE TO IMPACTS AND PRACTICES 421 (2004) (linking United States corn production to Gulf of Mexico’s hypoxic “dead zone”); MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA 35–79 (2006) (summarizing American agricultural policy and its effect on cropproduction decisions).
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These terrains give concrete expression to law, which in turns gives life
to background ideas about the value of nature, the human place in it, and the
right way to use it — or permissible ways to neglect or harm it. Seeing the
American landscape in these terms is a way to appreciate both the material
and the ideological content of environmental law, and how deeply the two
are entwined in a system that uses law to inscribe ideas in the shape of the
land. A map, literal or metaphoric, that can capture these relations will add
something to our understanding of what environmental law does.
CONCLUSION
The natural world is a plain and obdurate fact of American life and also
an object of rich imagination. Through ideas such as wilderness, waste, conservation, and even the concept of the environment, Americans have re-envisioned the continent while we have physically remade it. Many of the
interests our laws serve depend on ways of seeing and using the natural
world, from settler dignity to the paradoxically elevating humility of the
wilderness. Each statutory episode that this Article describes helped to create a landscape in keeping with the vision behind it and continues to structure American interaction with nature. These laws also express persistent
disagreement about nature’s value, disagreement that touches both material
interests and the environmental imagination. Once established, modes of
environmental public language become focal points for further conflict and
also sources of new ideas and appeals. We can enrich our map of both history and contemporary disputes by beginning to locate environmental law in
the longer story of American environmental imagination and public arguments about the natural world.
As for the future, we should ask an open-ended question: how might we
re-imagine our relationship to the natural world and put that new imagination into practical effect, as the movements, thinkers, and leaders of the past
did when they created the terms of today’s environmental debate? Answers
will come from the practical character of new problems, such as climate
change,251 and new cultural commitments around the human use of nature,
like those that have recently arisen around growing and eating food.252 The
next environmental imagination will be continuous in ways with what we
know now, but we should also expect it to be surprising, because innovation
is surprising. Our inherited environmental imagination frames our debates,
but it does not chain them. Each generation makes its own relation to the
natural world, though in circumstances it does not choose, and yet must understand, in order to change them.
251
I have speculated elsewhere about how environmental imagination might develop in
the face of climate change. See Purdy, supra note 16.
252
See, e.g., POLLAN, supra note 250 (describing and instancing a fascination with the
sources of food, the environmental implications of food systems, and participating in producing one’s own food).
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